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Vulnerability and Resilience in the Context of Transhumanist and Posthumanist Provocations*

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Abstract: At the threshold of a "post-pandemic" era, an overview of humanity's future must address the contrasting forces of this historical moment: the radical nature of vulnerability, an inseparable ally of resilience; the capacity for integration between an awareness of finitude and the willingness to respond to such knowledge; and the hubris (arrogance) of transhumanist and posthumanist provocations, which view vulnerability as an "accidental deficit" of human beings, a view that underpins their emergence. A reductionist and mechanistic understanding of the human being forms the foundation for aspirations of human improvement, neatly encapsulated in the concept of Human Enhancement (HE). The central tenet of HE is that anything technically possible is, by default, a matter of social justice: the endless expansion of possibilities becomes a morally obligatory and ameliorative good—both for the individual (a right) and for society (a duty)—implying responsibility for self-evolution. To achieve this, it is necessary to first uproot humanity from its ontologically given identity (the tabula rasa) and then reprogram it into a trans/post-human identity (the homunculus). The ideal of enhancement technologies forces us to reconsider not only the common understanding of human "nature" but also the fundamental character of human history: caducity (mortality). Therefore, this essay aims to engage with the theme of vulnerability and resilience in light of transhumanist provocations by questioning whether, and if so, how, the liberation of human nature from its mortal condition might unfold.

Keywords: Vulnerability; Human Enhancement; Posthumanism; Resilience; Transhumanism

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Vulnerabilidad y resiliencia en el contexto de las provocaciones transhumanistas y posthumanistas

Resumen: En el umbral de una era "pospandémica", una visión del futuro de la humanidad debe abordar las fuerzas contrastantes de este momento histórico: la radicalidad de la vulnerabilidad, aliada inseparable de la resiliencia; la capacidad de integración entre la conciencia de la finitud y la disposición a responder a dicho conocimiento; y la hybris (arrogancia) de las provocaciones transhumanistas y posthumanistas, que consideran la vulnerabilidad como un "déficit accidental" del ser humano, una perspectiva que fundamenta su aparición. Una comprensión reduccionista y mecanicista del ser humano constituye la base de las aspiraciones de mejora humana, encapsuladas en el concepto de Human Enhancement (HE). El principio central del HE sostiene que todo lo técnicamente posible es, por defecto, una cuestión de justicia social: la expansión ilimitada de posibilidades se convierte en un bien moralmente obligatorio y beneficioso, tanto para el individuo (como un derecho) como para la sociedad (como un deber), implicando así la responsabilidad de la autoevolución. Para lograr esto, primero es necesario arrancar a la humanidad de su identidad ontológicamente dada (la tabula rasa) y luego reprogramarla en una identidad trans/post-humana (el homúnculo). El ideal de las tecnologías de mejora nos obliga a reconsiderar no solo la comprensión común de la "naturaleza" humana, sino también el carácter fundamental de la historia humana: la caducidad (mortalidad). Por lo tanto, este ensayo busca abordar el tema de la vulnerabilidad y la resiliencia a la luz de las provocaciones transhumanistas, cuestionando si, y en caso afirmativo, cómo podría desarrollarse la liberación de la naturaleza humana de su condición mortal.

Palabras clave: vulnerabilidad; mejora humana; posthumanismo; resiliencia; transhumanismo

Vulnerabilidade e resiliência no contexto das provocações transumanistas e pós-humanistas

Resumo: No limiar de uma era "pós-pandêmica", uma visão do futuro da humanidade deve abordar as forças contrastantes desse momento histórico: a radicalidade da vulnerabilidade, aliada inseparável da resiliência; a capacidade de integrar a consciência da finitude com a disposição para responder a esse conhecimento; e a *hybris* (arrogância) das provocações transumanistas e pós-humanistas, que consideram a vulnerabilidade como um "déficit acidental" do ser humano — uma perspectiva que fundamenta seu surgimento. Uma compreensão reducionista e mecanicista do ser humano constitui a base das aspirações de aprimoramento humano, encapsuladas no conceito de *Human Enhancement* (HE). O princípio central do HE sustenta que tudo o que é tecnicamente possível é, por padrão, uma questão de justiça social: a expansão ilimitada de possibilidades torna-se um bem moralmente obrigatório e benéfico, tanto para o indivíduo (como um direito) quanto para a sociedade (como um dever), implicando, assim, a responsabilidade da autoevolução. Para alcançar isso, é necessário primeiro arrancar a humanidade de sua identidade ontologicamente dada (a *tabula rasa*) e, em seguida, reprogramá-la em uma identidade trans/pós-humana (o homúnculo). O ideal das tecnologias de aprimoramento nos obriga a reconsiderar não apenas a compreensão comum da "natureza" humana, mas também o caráter fundamental da história humana: a caducidade (mortalidade). Portanto, este ensaio busca abordar o tema da vulnerabilidade e da resiliência à luz das provocações transumanistas, questionando se — e, em caso afirmativo, como — poderia se desenvolver a libertação da natureza humana de sua condição mortal.

Palavras-chave: vulnerabilidade; aprimoramento humano; pós-humanismo; resiliência; transumanismo

I. Introduction

Vulnerability and resilience are two essential aspects of the same concept: the limit. One represents a trait inherent in human nature, while the other denotes the ability of an individual to react to what follows from that limit. In this essay, the relationship between the two is understood as complementary and dialogical. Vulnerability, in particular, defines the creaturely identity of the human being—who discovers a shared, superstructural belonging to humanity through his natural predisposition to vulnerability—in the present, the historical past, and the future. Resilience, in turn, also shapes the human instinct to resist or react to the inherent nature of being open to "trauma," pain, precariousness, and, ultimately, the human limit.

The revaluation of these aspects will be examined in the context of two philosophical-scientific movements—Transhumanism and Posthumanism—that have entered common discourse, albeit marked by an intrinsic connection to the "new," or the openness to the future. These movements envision the future and the human being in ameliorative terms (enhancement), where "ameliorative" signifies the emancipation of the human from all that renders him fragile. Transhumanist and Posthumanist provocations challenge the traditional perception of vulnerability and, by extension, of resilience, as they are grounded in the belief that limits are an accidental—therefore eliminable—deficit. Consequently, the awareness of inherent transience cannot form the basis of a foundational anthropological or metaphysical understanding. By removing vulnerability from its social, cultural, (bio)ethical, and political context, the goal of enhancing the ability to withstand physical, psychological, and existential suffering becomes an absolute reliance on human potential—specifically, the scientific-technological potential.

As will be explored, these movements both oppose resilience per se and risk turning it into an exclusive expression of the Promethean myth that underlies their framework. This myth suggests that the ability to resist caducity (mortality) lies in reacting to it through the will to defeat it via scientific-technological progress. Clearly, common sense leads us to reject harm and pain for ourselves and others; however, the ethical dilemma arises when we examine the manner, intentionality, purpose, and circumstances under which we pursue this goal. In other words, the bioethical question arises with respect to the moral object of the human-technology relationship.

When human fallibility is equated with pathology or deviance, it opens the door for ethically legitimizing any "restorative" intervention aimed at achieving a greater good—one that aligns with an evolutionary ideal of well-being. This ideal, oriented toward perfectionism, remains indefinable in an ultimate sense because, by nature, it must stay open to the ongoing contributions of science and technology. This aspect becomes one of the problematic elements of the bioethical debate on human enhancement, as it complicates both a shared understanding of the limit and a unified vision of the common good, on which the ethical limit itself depends.

The transhuman subject strives to improve through so-called Human Enhancement Technologies (HETs) by fulfilling the duty to achieve the greatest possible good for himself, while also responding to the duty of social justice. This includes contributing to the improvement of the species, ensuring a self-directed evolutionary future focused on an infinitely expanded principle of well-being. Since this well-being is under direct human control, the hope is to overcome the limitations imposed by nature. This perspective also brings the emergence of new rights—the right to access all technological means necessary for self-enhancement.

However, this view also proposes a non-resilient stance toward human limits (mistakes, failures, illness, suffering, physical or mental disabilities, etc.). From this standpoint, the decisive role of technology emerges clearly in social, economic, legal, anthropological, religious, and (bio)political contexts. As Foucault suggested, the body assumes an absolute centrality in its relationship with the dynamics, forces, and management of power.

II. Vulnerability and resilience in the post-pandemic society

Vulnerability and resilience are two constituent elements of the same concept: the limit. They are in dialogue with each other and maintain a complementary relationship. Vulnerability, in fact, distinguishes the creaturely identity of the human being, who discovers in vulnerability a shared, superstructural belonging to humanity, both in the present, throughout history, and in the future. Resilience, in turn, equally defines the human instinct to resist or react to the aspects of human nature that are open to "trauma," pain, precariousness, and, ultimately, to limit.

In contrast, the scientific-philosophical provocations of the Transhumanist and Posthumanist movements seek to overturn the common perception of vulnerability—and, by extension, resilience. These movements base their arguments on the assumption that the limit is an accidental—therefore eliminable—deficit and, consequently, that awareness of our inherent transience cannot serve as a foundational anthropological or metaphysical premise. By removing vulnerability from its social, cultural, (bio)ethical, and political context, these movements push for an absolute reliance on human potential—specifically, scientific and technological potential—as the means to overcome suffering.

Vulnerability, however, is recognized as a defining aspect of the human experience. Its acknowledgment allows for the reduction of distances between individuals and communities and can alleviate the burden that vulnerability often entails, especially when it is marked by pain and illness. This is achieved through the community principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Subsidiarity emphasizes the priority of the person over society and outlines the moral duty, both for individuals and for the community, to address one another's needs and act to fulfill those needs. This is a fundamental social and political principle. Solidarity, in turn, emerges from and is a joint cause of subsidiarity. It is a moral principle inherently linked to social and ethical order, arising from an awareness of human needs and recognizing the human being as a constitutively imperfect, needy, and perfectible entity.

Together, subsidiarity and solidarity contribute to the construction of socio-political mechanisms that ensure individuals can thrive, live with dignity, pursue happiness, and cooperate in the realization of the common good. Why do these principles speak to vulnerability—and, we might add, resilience? The reasoning follows this logical thread: starting from a shared anthropological understanding of the human being's vulnerability, there emerges a socio-political, moral, and cultural framework that shapes a society capable of accommodating vulnerability and, by extension, strengthening itself to alleviate its burdens, as previously noted. Through this sensitivity, humanity develops an awareness of risk factors and a commitment to strengthening mechanisms for responding to, or reacting to, them.

In contrast to the Transhumanist and Posthumanist proposal, which focuses on enhancing traits that mitigate vulnerability, the aim here is not to erase the mortal nature of humans—along with everything that this entails—but to react to the traumas imposed by it.

What is important to emphasize is that human resilience is not limited to an attitude of resistance; rather, it enables the construction—and more specifically, the reconstruction—of a new life path. This path does not erase suffering or wounds but, on the contrary, uses them as a foundation from which to begin anew. The vulnus (wound) is therefore not removed, denied, or eliminated; instead, it is integrated and, above all, re-signified in the context of the person's own system of relationships and values. It is, thus, a dynamic process that enables the human subject, at any stage of life, to transform difficulties—of varying nature and intensity—into identity resources and the fullness of humanity. Those who develop resilience are not, and will not become, invulnerable. As Cyrulnik states, "They are as vulnerable as others, but, in addition, they have been wounded and will be wounded all their lives, and they will become human through this wound." (1)

Vulnerability creates the conditions for trust between humans, arising from reciprocity and

from the shared experience of being equally exposed to fragility. In this sense, it belongs to the language of "caring"—a concept not exclusive to the clinical sphere, but understood more broadly as a social commitment, a form of generosity toward the neighbor with whom we identify. It is evident that one of the challenges in developing a common sensitivity to vulnerability and enhancing the response to its challenges is identifying the risk factors on a phenomenological level (1). This ability depends on a complex array of factors that, phenomenologically, shape both the individual and the community in the elements where they are identified on moral, legal, anthropological, religious, cultural, and political levels. It also depends on the adversities faced by the individual in their personal life and the environment in which they are embedded. The difficulty lies in what the individual and/or community assess as a risk, and what they deem a good to pursue. These are two crucial variables when placed within an ethical framework for reasoning about the legitimacy of futuristic proposals that are based on the moral duty to use what technology offers—if it contributes to enhancement—while leaving its exact definition open to individual sensibility.

For this reason, caring—because of the constitutive vulnerability of the human being—becomes a universal language. It is grounded in human essence, in human dignity, which is ineliminable regardless of the conditions in which the individual finds themselves. Caring for others is based on the paradigm identified by Luigina Mortari, known as "donativity": "The act of giving, understood as dedicating thoughts and emotions, gestures and actions to the other, is the ethical essence of care" (2). This act projects the crisis caused by suffering into the practice of "having pity" (in Italian, soffrire-con, meaning to suffer with—to share in suffering, to take charge of it), where the body is not the disease, but an existential experience.

In contrast to the transhumanist attempt to defeat caducity for the greater good of individuals and the future of humanity, it seems appropriate to reflect on Jürgen Habermas's thoughts on genetic manipulation, where he invited us to consider the "blurring of the boundary between the nature that 'we are' and the organic endowment that 'we give ourselves' (3). Not all technologically possible interventions find moral justification, and some of them have the potential to alter humankind's self-understanding.

Contemporary intellectual thought often examines the problematic relationship with suffering and caducity within a broader view of the widespread progressive annihilation of moral and spiritual nature. This is not irrelevant to the capacity and quality of the questions humans ask about themselves and reality. In this context, the philosopher Byung-Chul Han's concept of "defactification" (4) emerges. It refers to the absolute, continuous, and massive production that prevents the world from stopping and, paradoxically, makes it "only" mortal—that is, closed to metaphysics, transcendence, and spirituality. Han describes this as "a shift from contemplative to productive life" (5). A radically mortal being, closed off from the need to find deeper ontological and metaphysical meanings within themselves, is part of a performance-obsessed society that is hostile to its own caducity, yet paradoxically lives in a fideistic relationship with immanence and techno-science.

Reading the human being through the lens of productivity and consumerism—characteristic of performance—leads to patterns of social standardization driven by the speed of technological advancement. This is in direct contrast to the slowness required by the gradual process of meaning-making, which demands time. This process is intrinsic to vulnerability, which, in turn, drives resilience, as the possibility of metabolizing reality makes understanding and active participation plausible.

In this sense, vulnerability is a human necessity for preservation and development. Returning to Mortari's thought: "The vulnerability of our being is grasped in the enigmatic nature of our origin and our end" (2) Regarding our origin, being accepted is part of the language of birth and procreation, which differentiates it from the reproductive mechanics of a system based on design, selection, and standardization of a manufactured object—toward which we demand conformity to our ideals of normality, adequacy, perfection, and efficiency.

Regarding our end, old age and transience are not exclusive signs of an existence that has come to an end but, belong to the entire life cycle of a living organism. Paradoxically, caducity suggests the vitality of a being who, if not alive, could not die. The fact that both origin and end are beyond our direct control, and that in this unavailability the human being finds protection for their inherent dignity, signals a shared universal reason in which the person represents an inviolable good. Within the person, the fundamental goods of human history reside.

The image of care is effective because it recognizes that humans are lacking—i.e., needy—which gives rise to the attention of care. This creates an asymmetrical relationship between doctor and patient (individual and society) in terms of power, characterized by dependence, trust, and passivity. The development of an "analgesic society"—in which "defactification" fuels what sociologist Zygmunt Bauman calls the "deconstruction of caducity" (6,5)—also affects the proper function of medical practice and techno-scientific research, shaping its purposes and limits. This is particularly relevant in the context of Human Enhancement Technologies (HETs), which present a challenge for medicine to distinguish between pathology and health, normal and abnormal, enhancement and therapy. As will be seen, Transhumanism commits to the deconstruction of caducity in its support for HETs, using it as a justificatory premise for moral enhancement. By removing vulnerability from its universal language, transience, pain, disease, aging, and other aspects of human life become repairable, optimizable, eliminable, and technicalizable biological "accidents."

III. Trans and Posthumanist provocations change the perception of the *humanum*

Both Transhumanists and Posthumanists, despite the diversity that characterizes and distinguishes the two movements, are driven by a shared attraction to longevity and immortality. This common interest often places the discourse surrounding these movements (or 'doctrines') within either a utopian or dystopian framework, depending on the perspective adopted. However, human history teaches that the desire for immortality is intrinsic to humanity, alongside a fear of pain and death; what changes is the approach to fulfilling this desire. Both movements stem from a need for well-being, comfort, perfectibility, development, happiness, and self-realization. They believe these goals can be achieved through a techno-scientific approach (Transhumanism), supported by a particular anthropological vision (Posthumanism). As Antonio Allegra explains, "the dichotomy between perfection and transformation—between transhuman disembodiment and posthuman hybridization—is the most relevant theoretical distinction within the field." Despite this, "in both spheres... there is a distinctive and significant reverence for a sort of metaphysics of evolution" (7). These two interconnected perspectives challenge the notions of 'human nature' and 'dignity': the new posthuman human being is a hybrid, malleable construct, in which corporeality is reified and its value adapted to criteria of productivity and efficiency.

"The bìos becomes machine, and the machine bìos in a short circuit where a meta-flesh emerges as a new horizon of possibility for the human being. It is in this new interpretation of humanity, marking the culmination of a progressive dissolution of traditional paradigms, that the path of liquefaction of objective space, the metaphysics of presence, and the concept of identity is realized at its highest level. [...] Post-metaphysics, on the other hand, represents the thought of a-being: an endless and aimless pursuit of a possibility that is never fulfilled, a rejection of fact, and a denial of the objectivity of being." (8)

In other words, this is the phenomenon that D'Agostino referred to as 'technomorphism,' or 'the idea that, through technique and artifice, human beings can freely shape all things. It is, in a sense, the most blasphemous translation, in contemporary terms, of the idea of creation' (9). In this regard, to move beyond the partisan confrontation between technophobes and technophiles, it is fitting to revisit a few lines from Martin Heidegger on the human-being-technology relationship. This allows us to highlight the reasons why the

philosophical exercise of questioning the real – in a context shaped by posthuman hope – challenges the human being in an unprecedented way, leaving him exposed before himself in the transition from homo faber to homo fabricatus (10). Heidegger states that:

What is truly disturbing is not that the world is becoming a complete domain of technique. What is far more unsettling is that humanity is not at all prepared for this radical transformation of the world. Even more troubling is that we are still unable to achieve, through meditative thinking, an adequate confrontation with what is truly emerging in our age." (11)

"It is no coincidence that today, particularly when analyzing the great trans and posthumanist provocations, reference is made to the human-technique dyad as a relationship of equals or, in the case of the two aforementioned philosophical movements, as a relationship between dissimilar terms. In this dynamic, the first term (the human being) aspires to the second (the technique) to such an extent that it seeks fusion with it; so much so that the human being retains the quality of 'agent' with respect to technique, while simultaneously being 'acted upon' by it. This bilateralism, which leads the philosophical milieu to speak of a 'techno-human condition' (12), necessitates a return to the center of our consideration: the question of 'homo novus,' devoid of contemplative thinking—as defined by Sergio Cotta—and what Herbert Marcuse refers to as 'the revolutionary subject,' the protagonist of a techno-human environment where the technological postulate (or 'technological imperative,' in other words, the way technique determines or conditions our questioning of ourselves) opens up a new metaphysics of technique. Once again, in history, the individual questions his own nature (quoting St. Augustine: 'quaestio mihi factus sum') (13), finding himself navigating the complexity of two fundamental questions produced by technological ambiguity, central to the trans/post-humanist provocations: 1) Is 'better' always and necessarily good? 2) How much is 'too much"? Hence, the 'discomfort of technology' (14, 15), which philosopher Arnold Gehlen describes as the problem of technological ambiguity within the cultural transformation it generates, emerges. This dual nature is summarized in the concept of 'pharmakon,' the Greek term for a substance with both lethal and curative properties, which reflects the paradox of a time when greater control leads to the weakening of control itself. Gehlen, while adhering to the idea that technology is part of human nature—emerging from evolution, survival, and predisposition (he argues for the inescapability of technology) (14)—does not fail to acknowledge that human intelligence, within the scope of technological potential, raises the fundamental anthropological question for humanity (14).

Technique, starting from its 'compensatory' role of perfecting (or crowning) human needs in response to the human being's limits—and quoting Gehlen, starting from the 'imperfections of human organs' (16)—is driven by the human being's constitutive deficiencies. These deficiencies propel the individual toward technological specialization. Technology thus constitutes a 'complexification' (14) of a servile relationship between agent and artifact, where the agent must meet the same performance expectations as its products. In this sense, the human being becomes a product, a 'function holder' (14) who sacrifices his uniqueness in favor of a system of massification and a process of 'standardization' (16), also referred to as 'normalization.'

As Marcuse explains, the utility of technique goes beyond necessity, delineating a 'self-evolutionary' orientation toward the future of humanity, where even the subject becomes subjected to the consumerist, performative, and, quoting Marcuse, 'productive' paradigm. In fact, Marcuse lucidly states, 'In this society, the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian to the extent that it also determines [...] individual and social needs and aspirations. Technology serves to establish new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of control and social cohesion' (17). What characterizes Marcuse's thought is the association between technological civilization, alienation, and automation, in which subjectivation becomes both the object and cause of the production, control, flattening, and massification apparatus that he identifies.

Here lies fertile ground for security and well-being (a concept often extended to health) to fuel the ambition to become imperishable and immune to vulnerability. Philosopher D'Agostino discusses this in biopolitical terms: a horizon in which weak individuals—bare flesh subject to transience—damage society, which demands to be 'repaired' from the ravages of imperfection. This becomes a (bio)political system as soon as the so-called process of 'repressive desublimation' (17), coined by Marcuse, takes over. In this process, the gap between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' (as also found in bioethics) is realized in the efficiency-oriented principle of immediacy, which creates needs. In our case, these needs respond to the utopia of tecnomorphic salvation.

This historical, philosophical, and scientific process has led to the so-called 'techno-human condition': a new identity status where individual members of the species and humanity become so intimate with technology that a clear separation between the two is difficult to discern. As a result, the new technologies acquire the character of pervasiveness and intra-organicity: from being external tools of the human being to becoming integral parts of his organism and biological nature. The anxiety toward achieving a perfectionist ideal, alongside the unprecedented techno-human condition, is well summarized in the concept of Human Enhancement. This concept expresses the pervasive use of technology, no longer as an external tool to satisfy human needs, but as an 'embodiment.' The central postulate is that every technically possible realization is, in fact, a matter of social justice: the indefinite expansion of possibilities becomes an ameliorative good—morally obligatory for us (as a right) and towards society (as a duty)—responsible for self-creation.

The perfectionist ideal, in addition to the bioethical controversies surrounding authenticity, safety, justice, autonomy, quality of life, and the limits and purposes of medicine, implies that in the final naturalization of the human being imagined in the post humanist model, the concept of human nature—and consequently, dignity—based on the principle of vulnerability, is downsized. The ineliminable common character of the members of the human family upholds solidaristic and justice principles, condemns eugenic forms of discrimination (in the case of HETs, we can speak of 'positive eugenics'), or those based on qualitative judgments about human beings that determine their 'acquired dignity' rather than their inherent, recognized dignity. Alongside the eugenic issue is the problem of social justice, which must be distinguished from the principle of a moral duty advocated by the proponents of the Movements and HETs: according to what sense and criterion of justice should a society be organized, and how should its structures be administered in a potentially discriminatory context? Who determines the criteria for defining 'abnormal' vs. 'normal'? What is the 'extra-clinical' meaning of normality when it comes to interventions requiring medical actions on the body? Is there an ethical limit? – as the debate splits into 'only human' (non-enhanced) vs. 'transhuman' (enhanced), invalidating the authenticity of our consent or refusal to enhance ourselves, as we seek to protect ourselves from forms of social marginalization?

HETs open processes of normalization without being able to define what 'best' should be sought. Can the good be presupposed in them regardless, and how would the limit serve as a warning to halt the 'overpowering' of technique in this context? In this context, one where it makes plausible an ontological reorganization of the human being and a social reorganization of the community, this form of 'domestication of technology' (18), in which society has been led 'to think that the artificial can become a model for what is natural' (18), raises the fundamental question: 'Can technology transform the human person into something else, manufacturing a new essence-nature?' (19).

As Vittorio Possenti explains, if this is permissible and would happen with the introduction of a 'more than person' or 'less than person,' i.e., something that is no longer human (19), then the immutable datum of history and the philosophy of history would be lost: 'the permanence and unity of the concept of person' (19). For this to occur, it would be necessary to first uproot the human being ('tabula rasa') (20) from an ontologically given identity and then reprogram him into a dynamic,

disembodied, liquid (21), nomadic, and hybrid (a symbiont, the product of heterogeneous contaminations) post-human identity (homunculus) (22).

Roberto Marchesini, explaining the difference between the Transhumanist and Posthumanist vision, argues that:

> While the transhumanist view tends to shape the body according to desire and necessity by commodifying its phylogenetic nature, the posthumanist view, by embracing hybridization, 'allows for the realization of human predicates' (23), leading to the glorification of the phenomenon that Marchesini calls 'ontopoiesis' (23) and 'technopoiesis' (23). Human animality and the naturalization of the artificial creation of 'homo novus' thus generate a 'multividuality' (23), a contaminated and purified subjectivity, as the author repeatedly defines it, almost hinting at a kind of post-human 'spirituality.' In this anthropo-ontological revolution, technè is telos. However, in this case, the telos is not to have a teleological tension, i.e., to have the possibility of self-realization and signification (telos) survive alongside the belief that an ultimate end (telos) can always be a new product that man creates for himself. What Marchesini gets wrong when he draws a substantial distinction between Transhumanism and Posthumanism is that there can be no valorization of the body by uprooting it from the truth about corporeality, by removing its mortal condition that belongs to the nature of a person—an embodied spirit. Techno-embodiment (embeddedness) now makes room for the latter." (24)

From the personalist vision of the human being in his uniqueness and unity, we shift to determinist, functionalist, and materialist visions of immaterial spiritualization. In these views, every individual, as a 'non-patient' of the process from restitutio ad integrum to transformation ad optimum, is forced to neglect their identity tied to the 'memento mori,' becoming a 'docile body' (soma). If one does not conform to the actions of enhancement, they will be considered, at the threshold of normality, a disabled person who fails to fulfill the moral duties of social enhancement through self-enhancement (as justified in Savulescu and Bostrom's view of Moral Enhancement) (25,26). Human nature, including the subject's relationship with the bodily self, is mistakenly read as a human condition and thus as an object of manipulation. The therapeutic intent of Human Enhancement Technologies (HETs) creates a borderline position between increasing technical possibilism (the radicalized outcome being the post-human) and standardization (an agreement on the specificity of medical action, and the proper classification of health and illness). This duality is encapsulated in Ivan Illich's concept of 'social iatrogenesis': 'social iatrogenesis occurs when healthcare becomes a standardized commodity, an industrial product; when all suffering is 'hospitalized' [...]; when the language in which people might experience their bodies becomes bureaucratic jargon; or when suffering, mourning, and healing outside the role of the patient are classified as deviance' (27). Illich further argues that the extreme outcome of suppressing pain and illness, in contradiction, collapses any notion of 'deviance,' leading to an artificialization of the very experience of suffering. According to Illich, 'the suppression of pain increasingly transforms the individual into an insensitive spectator of the decadence of his own self' (27). Aspiring to perfection forces humanity to absorb into its culture a new 'pudendum' (28), or 'Promethean divide,' as Günther Anders calls it: 'I call "Promethean"... that difference which manifests itself as a fundamental difference; that is to say, that difference which exists between our "Promethean performance," between the products we, the "children of Prometheus," produce and all other performances; the fact that we do not live up to the "Prometheus who lives in ourselves"' (28). Amid the unquestioned benefits of continuous technological progress, the dystopia of the 'self-made man' (28) emerges, an aspiration that, as Anders explains, is nurtured by undervaluing oneself as a product of one's own desire, of one's own making. He explains: 'not because he can no longer stand anything he himself has not made, so he wants to make himself; but because he does not want to be something he has not made. Not because he is indignant about being made by others (God, the gods, nature), but because he is not made at all and, in his unmade quality, is inferior to all his manufactured products' (28). Making oneself

as a product prevents the lesson of contingency, from which the response to trauma emerges, and transmutes the technical medium into an ideal of perfection, rather than the instrument of coexistence (and resilience) with our constitutive vulnerability, as it is. This transmutation, identified by Anders, prevents access to the question of meaning that comes from the experience of mortality. Homo mortalis founds the original principle of resilience. In the posthumanist perspective, pain becomes a consumer disvalue: the solution to the social problem of mortality excludes the awareness inherent in the concept of 'resilience,' understood as a response to the trauma of suffering or of uncertainty. These elements embody the antagonistic features of the transhumanist manifesto, which leaves no room for resilience except as the expropriation of pain—a response of display rather than understanding and appropriation.

The transdisciplinary analysis of the neuro(bio) ethical and biopolitical dilemmas – with 'biopolitics' understood as the exercise of power over life, health, and bodies; arbitrary power, detached from the limits imposed by the bìos, which in a strongly dualistic sense is seen as object rather than subject – must begin with a fundamental anthropological question: Who is the human being of the 'analgesic society' – or 'pain-free society' (29)? This is the being who aspires to become a 'product' of technical power and is called upon to be. The risk becomes evident when the split between body and person allows for the exercise of (bio)power based solely on the recognition of weak, variable rights and duties, contingent upon circumstances, including the will of the subject or the collective good. According to this perspective, the person follows power, while power establishes itself. The hypertechnical analgesic society, indifferent to the ontological dimension of pain and the inevitability of dying, loses the binomial of rights and duties – that humanizing sense of reciprocity, which is essential to the global task of being a community that heals. This gap, as mentioned at the beginning, is acutely felt in the caring relationship and in the culture of care, which Simone Weil defines as the highest expression of generosity. Daniel Callahan (30, 5) has made a significant contribution to analyzing the temptations of modern medicine, particularly specifying how hostility to death and transience is one of them. The postmodern temptation, most notably expressed by the posthuman, is the desire to domesticate death and make it an eliminable aspect. If the human being becomes an 'object' of resistance and not resilience, the 'deconstruction of mortality' (6) takes place, executed by a civilization where vulnerability is alien and hostile – the same one that philosopher Byung-Chul Han refers to as a 'palliative society,' algo-phobic, which adopts a stance of 'permanent anaesthesia' (29) towards accepting the reality of suffering in favor of performance.

Consequently, we come to understand the danger of dissolving the virtuous alliance between vulnerability and its understanding (resilience) into the artificialization of the human being as a technocentric response to the 'malaise of uniqueness' (28) and an unprecedented attempt to 'solve' the problem of the human limit.

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