ATRIA LEMAITRE, FERNANDO. Persons, Things, Rights. []. , 54, pp.163-200.   04--2023. ISSN 0122-9893.  https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n54.06.

This article explains the positive, legal concept of person. To do so, it discusses the differences among such concept and the corresponding moral concept and also the legal concept of "a thing". Indeed, the distinction between personas and things is recognized as a fundamental legal dichotomy which evolved, during the codification, towards a unification of the concept of person and a simplification of the concept of thing. This dichotomy depends on a positive definition of person and a negative definition of thing. The positive definition of person is dependent on the notion of "a right", which serves to show the superiority of the interest theories right (rights as legally protected interests). Criticisms of this dichotomy and of the unitary concept of person, particularly in the context of discussions about rights of non-human animals and of nature, allow for a better understanding of the positive legal concept of person: a being with the capacity to hold rights. This is taken to mean a recognized perspective from which states of affaires can be judged as advantageous/ detrimental, i.e. from which interests can be identified.

: Persons; things; rights; interest theory of rights; rights of non-human animals; rights of nature.

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