GARCIA DUQUE, Carlos Emilio. Karl Popper's scientific realism, as coherent as it is possible. []. , 16, 27, pp.63-86. ISSN 0124-6127.  https://doi.org/10.17151/difil.2015.16.27.5.

According to some authors, Popper's realism is blatantly incoherent mainly because of his commitment with the correspondence theory of truth and due to the fact that in his theory of science is granted that, though the general aim of science is the search for truth, it might happen that a specific theory reaches that aim without us being able of knowing it. In this paper, I explain, briefly, the particularities of Popper's realism, his views on truth as a regulative ideal for science, and I show that, regardless the impossibility of establishing in a definitive way that truth has been reached, there is no incoherence that endangers his project. In this way, I answer Cardenas and others' criticisms against Popper's realism and his views on the general aim of science, and I identify the sources from which this kind of misunderstanding springs.

: Popper; realism; absolute truth; objective truth; aim of science.

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