Abstract

RIVERA-NOVOA, Ángel. Religious Beliefs, Ineffability and Truth. Franciscanum [online]. 2017, vol.59, n.168, pp.23-61. ISSN 0120-1468.

The aim of this article is to establish a condition of possibility to interreligious dialogue or atheistic-religious dialogue. This condition consists in taking the concepts of «true» and «conditions of truth» as central elements of religious belief's nature. Further, in order to make possible the dialogue, any feature of ineffability must be kept out of a successful description of religious belief. So, firstly, I will examine the Wittgenstein's work in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to show that, in this approach, all religious discourses are meaningless and, therefore, no real dialogue is possible. Secondly, I will analyze the late work of Wiitgenstein, to show that concepts like «game-language», «form of life» and «aspect sightedness» are not sufficient devices to make possible the dialogue. In general, I argue that both of Wittgenstein's perspectives fail because assume the ineffability as a central attribute of religious belief. Finally, I argue that the concepts of «true» and «conditions of true» are essential to religious belief, if we want to grant the interreligious dialogue. I will defend that Davidson's radical interpretation is useful for this purpose and, likewise, permits tolerance between religious and divergent points of view.

Keywords : Religious belief; ineffability; truth; interreligious dialogue; tolerance.

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