Abstract

ORNELAS BERNAL, Jorge Roberto. Metaphors, Analogies, and Thought Experiments as Counterfactual Conditionals: a Metaphilosophical account of Scientific Methodology. Prax. filos. [online]. 2016, n.43, pp.201-224. ISSN 0120-4688.

In this paper I try to show two things: first, that some methodological devices such as metaphors, analogies and thought experiments can be subsumed under the more general category of counterfactual conditional, and second, that epistemic force of these same devices lies on the reliability of the cognitive capacities which take place in counterfactual reasoning. I analyze Williamson's theory of imagination according to which, imagination is the factive and reliable capacity behind counterfactual reasoning. I conclude with three objections to this theory in order to show that the epistemic status of these methodological devices has not been established yet

Keywords : imagination; counterfactual reasoning; thought experiments; metaphors; scientific methodology.

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