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Cuadernos de Economía

Print version ISSN 0121-4772

Abstract

LARROSA, Juan M.C. Non cooperative Stackelberg network formation. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2014, vol.33, n.63, pp.339-358. ISSN 0121-4772.  https://doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v33n63.45336.

Non-cooperative network formation games in industrial organizations analyze how firms create links. We assume that links portray cost-reducing information and that access to this information is not reciprocal. We study the consequences in terms of profits if one firm can move first in establishing a link. A classic model of exogenous Stackelberg leadership is developed and first-mover advantage is observed.

Keywords : Non-cooperative games; network formation strategies; Stackelberg equilibrium; sequential decision.

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