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DYNA
versión impresa ISSN 0012-7353versión On-line ISSN 2346-2183
Resumen
CRESPO, FERNANDO A. y PAREDES, RICARDO D.. A MECHANISM FOR EFFICIENT AND FAIR NIMBY LOCATION. Dyna rev.fac.nac.minas [online]. 2009, vol.76, n.160, pp.293-303. ISSN 0012-7353.
Whilst NIMBY (Not In My BackYard) are facilities necessary to society, are rejected for communities that host them. Thus, in contexts where bad compensation mechanisms exist, communities do not reveal the cost of hosting and social evaluation is severely limited. That explains why NIMBYs are finally located in base of corporate pressures, without technical criteria and with bias against the poorest localities. We propose decentralized mechanism to locate a NIMBY that I efficient (the NIMBY goes to the lowest cost location), and fair (all communities, including the host, are not worse off). The mechanism has balanced budget, and it fulfill the conditions of individual rationality.
Palabras clave : NIMBY; mechanism design, localization; auctions.