Resumen

TOMASINI BASSOLS, Alejandro. Wittgenstein: Identity and Indiscernibility. Prax. filos. [online]. 2008, n.26, pp.13-32. ISSN 0120-4688.

My aim in this paper is to combine historical reconstruction with conceptual analysis. What in the first place I intend to show is that, based on a variety of quite smashing arguments, Wittgenstein just demolishes the set of philosophical misunderstandings that center round the famous Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. So I first introduce the difficulty in a straightforward way and then I examine some well known views, in particular those of Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege and F. P. Ramsey. I then carry out a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s assault on the philosophical use of the logical notion of identity such as he deploys it both in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and during some of his lectures, after his return to Cambridge. I finally put forward some criticisms of mine in order to show that theWittgensteinian view according to which there are no real problems in philosophy but mere conceptual confusions is in this particular case clearly confirmed.

Palabras clave : identity; indiscernibility; logic; properties; use.

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