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Praxis Filosófica

versión impresa ISSN 0120-4688versión On-line ISSN 2389-9387

Resumen

ALVARADO MARAMBIO, José Tomás. Incomplete Modal Spaces. Prax. filos. [online]. 2009, n.28, pp.143-168. ISSN 0120-4688.

This work presents and discusses several forms of construing the modal ontological space, assuming possible worlds as maximal structural universals, and assuming also that there is no way to represent with structural universals the facts about transworld identity and distinctness between objects. Two main theoretical options determine the configuration that the modal space would have: (a) the introduction as component of maximal structural universals of actual individuals' haecceitates, and (b) the introduction of counterparts. In the case (a), the facts about transworld identity of merely possible objects is not determined. It is argued that it is not reasonable to supplement this configuration of modal space with counterparts. In the case that haecceitates are not introduced, all transworld facts of identity and distinctness of objects are not determined, so here the supplement of counterparts is most welcomed. These options have their own theoretical costs regarding, for example, accessibility relations between possible worlds and other crucial modal theses.

Palabras clave : Modality; possible worlds; identity; structural universals; haecceitas; counterparts.

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