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Praxis Filosófica

versión impresa ISSN 0120-4688versión On-line ISSN 2389-9387

Resumen

ORDONEZ PINILLA, Camilo Andrés. Mcdowell: passivity, content and perception. Prax. filos. [online]. 2017, n.44, pp.13-36. ISSN 0120-4688.

In his book Mind and World, John McDowell proposes a characterization of perception as a passive cognitive process. In this text I want to show that such characterization has a fundamental problem: it would imply that perception has not content, according to McDowell’s model of intentionality. Since such consequence is undesirable in McDowell’s philosophical project, this would show that there is a logical tension between McDowell’s conception of experience as a passive process and his conception of the conditions for content. In order to achieve this goal, first, I will explain what means to sustain that perception is passive, in McDowell’s sense. Second, I will propose that if McDowell’s model of intentionality, content and passivity is assumed, it would not be possible that perception be both passive and contentful (i.e. an intentional state).

Palabras clave : perception; passivity; content; intentionality.

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