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Praxis Filosófica
versión impresa ISSN 0120-4688versión On-line ISSN 2389-9387
Resumen
LOPEZ-ASTORGA, Miguel. Aristotle and Boethius: Two Theses and Their Possibilities. Prax. filos. [online]. 2021, n.53, pp.69-84. Epub 27-Ago-2021. ISSN 0120-4688. https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i53.11478.
There is a kind of logical theses that can be a cognitive problem. They are theses that are not tautologies and people tend to accept as absolutely correct. This is the case of theses such as those of Aristotle and Boethius. This paper tries to give an explanation of the reasons why this happens. The explanation is based on the theory of mental models. However, it also resorts to modal logic and the account of the ideas presented by Lenzen. Thus, relating the general framework of the theory of mental models to basic aspects of modal logic and this last account, a possible solution of the problem is proposed.
Palabras clave : Aristotle’s thesis; Boethius’ thesis; mental models; modal logic; possibility.