Resumo

SNYDER, Richard  e  DURAN MARTINEZ, Angélica. DRUGS, VIOLENCE, AND STATE-SPONSORED PROTECTION RACKETS IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA. colomb.int. [online]. 2009, n.70, pp.61-91. ISSN 0121-5612.

Illegality does not necessarily breed violence. The relationship between illicit markets and violence depends on institutions of protection. When state-sponsored protection rackets form, illicit markets can be peaceful. Conversely, the breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets, which may result from well-meaning policy reforms intended to reduce corruption and improve law enforcement, can lead to violence. The cases of drug trafficking in contemporary Mexico and Colombia show how a focus on the emergence and breakdown of state-sponsored protection rackets helps explain variation in levels of violence both within and across illicit markets.

Palavras-chave : protection rackets; drugs; violence; Mexico; Colombia.

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