Resumo

GOMEZ ESPINDOLA, Laura Liliana. Disputes of Epicurus and Chrysippus on logical neccesity. Prax. filos. [online]. 2013, n.37, pp.57-74. ISSN 0120-4688.

This article will focus on the proposals of Epicurus and Chrysippus against the thesis of the logical necessity of all events in the world defended by Diodorus Cronus. We defend that Epicurus rejected this kind of necessity claiming that the principle of bivalence does not apply to statements about future events and indicating that there are not eternal causes to ensure the truth of such propositions, given that the cause of these events can be a sudden atomic swerve. We will show that Chrysippus, in contrast, used the unrestricted validity of the principle of bivalence to show that there are eternal causes of everything and that, nonetheless, he asserted that this does not imply the logical necessity of specific events in the world

Palavras-chave : Fate; bivalence; necessity; antecedent causes and atomic swerve.

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