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Praxis Filosófica
versão impressa ISSN 0120-4688
Resumo
ISLER SOTO, Carlos. Is nominalism necessarily connected to a voluntarist conception of Natural Law? Ockham's and Hobbes' case. Prax. filos. [online]. 2014, n.38, pp.175-200. ISSN 0120-4688.
Nominalism is normally associated with a voluntarist conception of Natural Law, mainly because of the association of both doctrines in the work of William of Ockham. However, there is no necessary connection between them and, to show that, we will expound Hobbes' doctrine on the subject. In this author, a philosophical nominalism more extreme than that of Ockham, is associated with a completely necessitarist conception of Natural Law. In this sense, it can be said that in Hobbes there is, on moral matters, an inversion of Ockham's doctrine. In both cases there is recourse to God, but in Ockham's case, to provide the content of Natural Law and, in Hobbes', to warrant its obligatory character
Palavras-chave : Ockham; Hobbes; Nominalism; Natural Law; Divine Omnipotence; Psychological Egoism.