Objective/context:

We explore if legislators use roll call votes in the Chamber of Deputies in Chile as a tool to respond to the power of the president in the legislative process. Is there evidence of solidarity among legislators in their roll call votes? Do they vote more cohesively in legislator-initiated bills than in president-initiated bills?

Methodology:

With 5216 roll call votes by the 120 members of the Chamber of Deputies in Chile in the 2006-2010 and 2010-2014 terms, we look for evidence of legislative solidarity in how bills are voted. We use WUnity and WRice indicators and inferential analysis-ordinary least square regressions-to test 4 hypotheses.

Conclusions:

Government coalitions show more cohesion than opposition coalitions, though the rightwing coalition showed more cohesion than the leftwing coalition both as an opposition and a government coalition.

Originality:

We contribute to the studies on the behavior of legislatures in Latin America to assess if, given the president’s legislative powers, legislators use their roll call votes as a tool to express solidarity with other legislators voting in favor of legislator-initiated bills, using roll call votes as a way to counter balance the powerful legislative tools of presidents.