Resumo

CASTILLO V, María del Pilar  e  BALBINOTTO, Giácomo. FARC AND THE COSTS OF KIDNAPPING. Rev.econ.inst. [online]. 2012, vol.14, n.27, pp.147-164. ISSN 0124-5996.

This article analyzes, from an agency theory perspective, the effects produced on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by both political kidnapping as a long-run political strategy, and its long duration caused by Álvaro Uribe's government decision to not accept prisoner exchanges. These elements led to a separation between the FARC leaders' objectives and the goals of its field commanders. In such a case, the connection between them reveals the existence of a moral hazard problem which has become stronger and more harmful over time.

Palavras-chave : agency theory; kidnapping; contracts.

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