āstika and nāstika

The words, āstika and nāstika, and their derivatives and cognates are often used for the philosophical systems in India. These words do not occur in the Vedic Saṃhitās. Nāstikya appears only once in the late Maitrāyanīya Upaniṣad (MaiUp) 3.5. Another word, unique in the whole of Upaniṣadic literature, is avaidika, ‘non-vedic,’ occurring in the same work (7.10). This is the first indication of a division made between two traditions - Vedic and non-/anti-Vedic. The MaiUp (7.8) offers an interesting record of what is meant by non-vedic.

Here is a rich field for the study of heresiology from the brahmanical point of view. Several heretical doctrines advocated by their followers are mentioned. The list includes Buddhism (kaṣāya-kuṇḍalina), śakti-worship (kāpālina), cults around popular beliefs in ghosts and goblins and other supernatural evil beings (yakṣa-rākṣasa- bhūta-gaṇa-piśāca, etc.). At the same time, members of some professional groups, such as dancers and actors (naṭa…raṅgāvatāriṇa), employees engaged in king’s business (rājakarmaṇi), that is, government servants (or those degraded to royal service), are also included for no obvious reasons. N. Tsuji says: ‘Can one find, for instance, in any great Upaniṣad such an unreserved attack on false doctrines, including most probably Buddhism, as in the Maitrāyanīya Upaniṣad 7:8-10?’ (qtd. S. Bhattacharji 2:180). The list covers all sorts of people who are also condemned in the brahmanical Dharmaśāstras.

A similar list of ‘false views,’ this time from the Budd- hist point of view, is found in ‘The Sixty-two Kinds of Wrong Views,’ in the ‘Perfect Net Sutta,’ Long Discourses (‘Brahamajāla Sutta’, Dīgha Nikāya 1.1). Much later, a comparable list of nearly fifty sorts of heretics, this time from the Jain point of view, is given in Siddharṣi (tenth/ eleventh century CE)’s An Allegorical Tale of the World (Upamiti-bhava-prapañcā-kathā, hereafter UBhPK), pp. 547-48. Only a handful few of the cults survive in their old names; most of them perhaps disappeared in the course of time or merged with other cults. Their identity, or even the literal meaning of some such communities, cannot be deciphered with certainty. They do not occur anywhere else in the whole of Sanskrit literature. (For a survey of these sects see Jacobi’s Introduction to the UBhPK, pp.xxvii-xxxv).

In order to combat scepticism, besides having resort to verbal testimony (śabda, āptavākya), as the authority of Yama is invoked in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (KathUp),¹ the concept of Knowledge (vidyā) was held up in the Upaniṣads as something to be sought and attained, which would lead to freedom (mukti, mokṣa).

With a view to establishing the need for freedom, belief in the existence of the Other World was necessary; it was the pre-condition for the attainment of freedom. This is how in the Upaniṣads, Knowledge was to replace Sacrifice, the basic plank of the Vedic religion. Thus, nāstika came to refer to the disbeliever in the Other World as hinted at in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1.2.20. The doubting Naciketas asks Yama, the Lord of the World of the Dead:

’this constant doubt about a man departed - Some say he is, and others say he is not -

this do I wish to know of thee (Yama)…’ (Roby ^{Datta’s trans. 1983} p.21)

The derivation of astika and nāstika was most probably from this source.

āstika and nāstika in Pānini and after

It should be remembered that although Pāṇini refers to the origin of the āstika, the nāstika and the daiṣṭika (Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.4.60) there is no indication of whose exis- tence or non-existence he had in mind. Many centuries later two Buddhist commentators of the Aṣṭādhyāyī explained the words in terms of having belief and no belief in the Other World. However, as yet there is no indication that the belief would be in anyway related to the Veda as also the reviler of the Veda (as in Manu 2.11). Moreover, whatever be the date of the Aṣṭādhyāyī all the philosophical systems had certainly not evolved by Pāṇini’s time. It is clear from the commentaries and sub-commentaries that all the three words derived from asti, nāsti, diṣṭa refer to individuals holding such views, rather than the philosophical systems subscribing to them. Most of the references concerning nāstikas in the Dharmaśāstras, too, refer to persons rather than any philosophical systems. The occurrence of these words in the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa vulgate 2. 109 should not detain us, for the passages that contains them have been proved to be later additions (see crit. ed. Additional Passage 2241* lines 21-26 and 2241 (B)* and R. ^{Bhattacharya 2016}b pp.185-204 for further details).

All this shows that both āstika and nāstika originally belonged exclusively to the domain of Dharmaśāstra. Over time they were made to intrude in a different domain, not at all related to Dharmaśāstra. From the time darśana was declared to be Mokṣaśāstra, a neat one-to-one correspondence between the four aim(varga)s of life and the four śāstras has been worked out. Each śāstra claimed to be the supreme one in so far as it involved the most important aim of life.

This was not the case when Vātsyāyana’s Kāmasūtra was redacted. He knew of only three vargas (1.2.51). So the equation between darśana and Mokṣaśāstra must have been made some time after the 400 CE. Thus darśana, originally a secular discipline, became an instrument of achieving freedom, a concept related to theology, not philosophy.

The idea of freedom, however, differs from one philosophical system to another. Vedānta, for example, would not care to accept the state of freedom acknowledged by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. One devout Vaiṣṇava is said to have declared: ‘I would rather move in beautiful Vṛndāvana as a jackal but will never pray for the freedom of the Vaiśeṣikas’ (varaṃ vṛndāvane ramye śṛgālatvaṃ vrajamyaham/ na tu vaiśeṣikīṃ muktiṃ prārthayāmi kadācana. Qtd. Tarkava- gisa 1978 p.7). The concept of heaven in the Mīmāṃsā system has nothing in common with that of any other. It is heaven rather than freedom that the Mīmāṃsakas cherished.

Gradually in the philosophical literature, too, nāstika came to mean primarily the reviler of the Veda, an idea that had originated with the religious law-makers. It was taken over by the Veda-abiding philosophers as well. Dharmaśāstra thus came to assail Mokṣaśāstra, a name given to darśana as a whole (of course the pro-Vedic systems only). What is often forgotten is that the second meaning of āstika did not affect the Jains and the Buddhists. Even though, along with the materialists, they were branded nāstikas by the Vedists, Jain and Buddhist philosophers continued to use the two words in the old sense: so much so that, even as late as in the eighth century ce Haribhadra declares the Jain and the Buddhist systems as āstikavādins (Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya verse 78d) along with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Jaiminīya (Mīmāṃsa) mata(view)s. By nāstika they all meant the materialists and the materialists alone (for instance, Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha 22.1871: nāstikatā; Hemacandra, Anya-yoga-vyaveccheda-dvātriṃśikā verse 20: nāstika). Nāstika-śiromaṇi, the crest jewel of the nāstikas, in Sāyaṇa- Mādhava’s Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha chap.1, however, could have been used in either of the senses, disbeliever in the Other World and anti-Vedic.

Objections to the āstika/nāstika scheme

Several objections have been raised concerning the āstika/nāstika division. First, the question of adhering to or reviling the Veda goes against etymology. Admittedly meanings of words change, the etymology may be forgotten. ‘But instances are perhaps rare where the meaning of a word is fixed, in total disregard to etymology, just on the whim of an individual’, i.e., Manu (^{Gangopadhyaya 1990} p.16). Second, the division originates from a non-philosopher. ‘Manu is after all a law-giver and not a philosopher. Unlike the philosopher, the law-giver may not be concerned with an essentially rational approach to reality. Rather he is interested in the security of a social structure which he considers to be the most desirable and ideal’ (ibid.). Third, the division is based on the scripture of a particular religion, Brahmanism ‘What would be the situation if the similar principle is adopted for classification by other religions or systems also? If the Carvaka-s urged that the only criterion for being astika is faith in the Brihaspati-sutra, what would be the fate of the other systems?’ (ibid p.17). Fourth, is the veneration for the Veda genuine or fake? Instances have been cited from the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems that ‘apparent piety’ has been grafted to philosophical enquiries presumably to avoid the censure of the law-givers (ibid pp.18-20).

In view of all this, the āstika/nāstika division appears to be prompted by considerations other than philosophical.

tarka and heresy

In the brahmanical tradition the role of tarka (argument) was not denied or discounted, but it was recommended with a proviso: it must not be inconsistent with the Vedas and Smṛtis.² The mention of the latter (śāstra) is to be noted well, for it involves not only the world of ideas but also the customs to be observed in social life.

The reason for bracketting all nonvedic doctrines along with the outcasts and other condemned social groups in the MaiUp is not known. Its commentary by Rāmatīrtha is not of any use in this regard. But more interesting is the description of the archheretic:

Thus the text says: Erring because of the sophisms, false illustrations and the grounds of the doctrine that holds there is no atman, the world does not know what the conclusion of Vedic wisdom is. (MaiUp 7.8)[van Buitinen’s trans.]

vṛthā-tarka-dṛṣṭānta-kuhakendrajālair vaidikeṣu paristhātum icchanti taiḥ saha nairātmavāda-kuhakair mithyā-dṛṣṭānta-hetubhiḥ…na jānāti veda-vidyāntarantu yāt.

The word kuhaka used twice is highly significant. Apparently, the doctrines of rationalism and infideism were already posing a grave threat to the Vedists, for a section of the people, whatever might have been their number, was being drawn to them and getting convinced in the inefficacy of performing what they considered to be nonsensical rituals. These doctrines were working like magic and getting hold over the mind of the people. The list of heretics, a medley of all sorts of social outcasts, entertainers, and followers of popular cults (the socalled ‘Little Tradition’), includes all those heterodox groups and heretics whose very existence was a matter of great concern to the orthodox Vedists. The opponents of the Vedic tradition were generally clubbed together; they were called nāstika, pāṣaṇḍa (pākhaṇḍa), haituka (hetuka), etc.; in one word, avaidika (as in the MaiUp). (For details see Squarchini)

It is no wonder, therefore, that the Dharmaśāstras (Books of Religious Law) consider nāstikya as a lapse (pātaka). The Manu-, Yājñavalkya- and Viṣṇu-Saṃhitās in particular, call nāstikya a lapse, albeit minor (upapātaka).³ While explaining the lapse involved in reviling the Veda and forgetting the Veda (along with giving false evidence). Manu 11.56 considers all of them as lapses similar to drinking intoxicating beverage (surā), which is a major lapse. Apparently, an upapātaka can be and presumably was treated as a mahāpataka too.

nāstika in Dharmaśāstra literature

The commentators of the Manu were not sure what exactly was meant by nāsti, ‘(it) exists not’. Medhātithi, Kullūka, Govindarāja and others offer several explanations: a nāstika, for instance, is a non-believer in the Other World, a reviler of the Veda, a denier of the doctrine of karman and its effects, etc. (see the glosses on Manu 11.65 in Dave 6:62-63). The word had already become polysemous, related to both theology and philosophy. Sometimes the same commentator offers alternative meanings while glossing nāstika or any of its derivatives (e.g., Govindarāja on Manu 2.11: ‘a firm denier of the Other World, [and] a reviler of the Veda,’ nāsti paralokādi rityevaṃ stithaprajñaḥ vedanindako). Two commentators, Rāghavānanda and Nandana, for reasons best known to them, refrained from explaining nāstika in Manu 2.11. Yājñavalkya 3.228 too considers reviling the Veda and forgetting the Veda after knowing and studying it, as a lapse similar to the killing of a brahmana, which, like drinking intoxicating beverage, is a major lapse. So, nāstikya is treated not so much as one of the forty nine minor lapses (anupātakas and upapātakas enumerated in Manu 11.60-67). It would be rewarding to follow the glosses on nāstika and its cognates in the Smṛti texts and the commentaries thereon, if only the works could be reliably dated and preferably localized (in which part of the Indian sub-continent they were written) with a considerable degree of certainty.

Let it be noted in this connection that the commentators were not overtly interested in philosophy as the text too was not. Nevertheless, hetuka in Manu 4.30 is a person ‘not fit to be honoured’ whereas in 12.111 he is one who must be a member of the Pariṣad. In the Yājñavalkya- smṛti 3.301 a hetuka is one well versed in the principles of Mīmāṃsā and the śāstras. To Medhātithi hetuṣāstra is nāstika tarkaśāstraṃ bauddha-cārvākādi śāstraṃ (on Manu 2.11). It is repeatedly proclaimed in this śāstra that the Veda is conducive to demerit (Vedo’dharmāya). Medhātithi also explains haituka in Manu 1.129 as ‘one who creates doubt everywhere with the strength of reason (yuktivalena)’.

Not all translators of the Manu (Georg Bühler and Ganganatha Jha, for instance) paid much attention to the several meanings of nāstikya; some of them take it to mean ‘atheism’ and nothing else. The fact is that in all the old commentaries it is either the denial of the existence of the Other World (as in Vāmana and Jayāditya’s Padamañjarī and the Nyāsa on the Aṣṭādhyāyī) or that of the authority of the Veda (as in Manu 2.11) or both (For a fuller discussion see R. ^{Bhattacharya 2009}/2011, pp.227-231). Atheism is a later concept, not much relevant in relation to the general picture of lapse and atonement so elaborately itemized in the Dharmaśāstras. Only two commentators of Manu, Kullūka and Maṇirāma, explain nāstikya as denial of the doctrine of karman (glosses on Manu 11.65 in Dave 6:62-63).⁴

Lastly, despite the very widespread notion that Manu 2.11 provides a definition of the nāstika (Nicholson 2015 p.168), it is to be observed that nāstiko vedanindakaḥ can very well be explained as two different adjectives of the twice- born, that is, he is both a denier (of the Other World) as well as a reviler of the Veda. While studying the Dharmaśāstras and their commentaries we come along a host of words that are conceptually related to one another, although not semantically identical in all respects. They are employed in connection with nāstika and its derivatives in several Dharmaśāstras.⁵

Not all commentators explain all these terms in the same way. Most probably, they too were not sure what exactly the implication of nāstikya was. Sarvajnanārayaṇa, for example, explains nāstikavṛttayaḥ as those who think there is no effect of karman (nāsti karmaphalam ityabhimāninaḥ). However, what emerges from the list and the interpretations is a general denunciation of all sorts of heretical and heterodox doctrines. Nāstika is an umbrela term; one who says ‘no’ to any of the fundamental doctrines of the brahmanical religion (which came to be known in later times as Hinduism) is branded as a nāstika. The word has more significations in Dharmaśāstra/Smṛti literatura than in darśana, where it stands for either ‘denier of the Other World’ or ‘denier of the authority of the Veda’.

Brhaspati conspicuous by his absence

Strangely enough, the word bārhaspatya, often used in philosophical literature as a synonym of nāstika, Cārvāka, and lokāyatika (or laukāyatika) (see R. ^{Bhattacharya 2013}a pp.3-8), is conspicuous by its absence in the Dharmaśāstra/ Smṛti literature. Could it be due to the cause that there was a Smṛti work attributed to Bṛhaspati (as there was also an Arthaśāstra text attributed to him, for instance, in the KA 1.2.4)? Although the text is now lost, enough fragments are available to show that the author of the Bṛhaspati-smṛti was as respectful of Manu as expected of any Veda-abiding conformist. The author of this work accepts Manu as the highest authority ‘because he has embodied the essence of the Veda in his work’ (Aiyengar (ed.) 27.3; see also Jolly p. 387). A reference to the Bṛhaspati-nīti (nītiṃ bṛhaspatiproktāṃ) in Mbh 3.33.56-57 (critical edition) reveals that the moral teachings of this Bṛhaspati was believed to be congenial to the royalty, so much so that learned brahmaṇas were employed by kings like Drupada to teach it to his sons (Mbh 3.33.56-57 crit. ed.; vulgate 3.32). This Bṛhaspati-nīti too has nothing to do with materialism. On the other hand, this Bṛhaspati believed in the doctrine of karman and God (vidhātā). Jacobi observed, not without some humour: ‘The Nītiteachings of Bṛhaspati, which Draupadī expounds in Mahābhārata III.32 [vulgate], are at any rate as orthodox as one can wish!’ (1911/1970 p.737; 1918 p.104).

This Bṛhaspati was of course not the same Bṛhaspati as the preceptor of the gods, who in some of the Purāṇas misleads the demon (asura)s by preaching anti-Vedic doctrines and thereby helps the gods win back their position (for details see R. ^{Bhattacharya 2013}c). Evidently there were several Bṛhaspatis (see Aiyenger Introduction pp.77-84; Dasgupta 3:531-532) and the redactors of and commentators on the Smṛtis did not wish to confuse their readers by referring to Bṛhaspati while delineating on the nāstikas. One single word, nāstika, was made to bear the burden of all sorts of heresy and heterodoxy.

Long before the Cārvākas appeared on the scene (c. eighth century ce), there were definitely other materialists, individuals as well as groups, belonging to different schools of materialism, such as Bhūtavāda and Lokāyata, as mentioned in the sixth-century Tamil epic Maṇimēkalai, chap.27.Or they might have been individuals, not connected with any materialist school at all. They were normally branded as nāstikas, not only by the brahmanical writers but also by the Jains. Saṅghadāsagaṇi (sixth/seventh century)’s Vasudevahiṃḍī (The Wanderings of Vasudeva) mentions ṇāhiyavādī (p.169), natthiyavāī (p.275) and nāhiyavādī (p.329) to suggest a materialist. Haribhadra (eighth century) in his Samarāiccakahā too speaks of nāhiyavādī (p.164). Ᾱryaśūra, a Buddhist poet, writes of anāstika (=āstika): ‘How should the believer in the true and rational doctrine commit a deed, which we are sure, neither the denial of causality (ahetuvādī), nor the believer in absolute dependence (paratantra-dṛṣṭiḥ) nor the non-materialist (anāstikaḥ) . . . would perform for the sake of a little glory?’ (23.57, p.215). It is not that such names as lokāyatika or bhūtavādin were not current before the eighth century. They both occur in Maṇimēkalai (27.264,273). Much later, in the tenth century, Siddharṣi in his UBhPK speaks of a city called Lokāyata in which the Bārhaspatyas reside (lokāyataṃ iti proktāṃ puram atra tathāparaṃ | bārhaspatyāśca te lokā ye vāstavyāḥ pure’tra bhoḥ || (Chapter 4, p. 661). These people are said to be under the influence of false perception (mithyādarśana) and wrong views, kudṛṣṭi (cf. Manu 12.95 that also speaks of kudṛṣṭayaḥ).

Guṇaratna (sixteenth century), a Jain scholar, believed that all darśanas, whether vedic or non-vedic in essence, were inextricably linked to one religious sect or the other.⁶ He therefore consistently relates the six/seven systems to their corresponding religious sects. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika belongs to the devotees of Śiva, Sāṃkhya to those of Nārāyaṇa, and Jaiminīya admits no other guru but the Veda. He typecasts the first as follows: they carry staffs, wear loincloth, have matted locks, their bodies are covered with ashes, they display sacred threads, etc. (pp. 49, 266). The followers of Sāṃkhya are Parivrājakas (wandering mendicants); they carry three staves or one (tridaṇḍā ekadaṇḍā vā), wear crimson robes, sit on deer skins, etc. (p.95), so do the Jaiminīyas (p.283). Guṇaratna similarly relates the Lokāyatikas to the Kāpālikas (p. 300), apparently because, in his view, every system of philosophy was associated with a religious sect. As his own religion (Jainism) and philosophy were the same, so it was with the Buddhists. Guṇaratna’s typecasting might have been true in his own times (although that too is doubtful), but it is utterly unacceptable for later times. Good Vaiṣṇavas have been followers of Nyāya and not all followers of Sāṃkhya are necessarily devotees of Nārāyaṇa.

Moreover, Haribhadra’s one-to-one correspondence between the deity (devatā) and its principle (tattva), as told in verse 2, may not be altogether true. In some cases religious sects beget their own philosophical systems; in other instances, some other philosophical systems have a secular origin, owing nothing to any religious sect. The Cārvāka/Lokāyata is a case in point. Nevertheless, the fact remains that even Sāṃkhya, the most pronounced atheistic philosophical system (in the modern sense of not ad- mitting any God or gods) and perhaps the oldest, admits śabda (verbal testimony) as a valid instrument of cognition (prāmaṇa) and regards the Veda as the Word of Words. There is no reference to God in the list of categories in the base text of Nyāya, yet right from Vātsyāyana, author of the first available commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, down to the sub-commentators, all place the Veda on a par with perception and inference.⁷ Thus, even though no God or gods/goddesses are necessarily to be obeyed or worshipped by the āstika philosophers and their adherents, adherence to the Veda is sine qua non for all āstikas.

The only exception to these Veda-abiding systems, and such non-vedic yet religious (although atheistic) schools are the materialists, who at least from the time of the Buddha (sixth/fifth century bce) defied all religious bindings and allegiance to the holy texts, and yet developed a parallel, radical system of philosophy. The base text(s) and the commentaries thereon are not available as yet - everything seems to have disappeared after the twelfth century - but there are just enough fragments to bear testimony to their existence.

The division of the philosophical systems into āstika and nāstika in its current commonly cited form is not very old. It is not found before the twelfth century. Kṛṣṇamiśra in his allegorical play, Prabodha-candrodaya makes use of this division. His concept of the nāstika, however, is not always modelled on the new meaning, namely, non-Vedic. Mahāmoha, the king of evil, accuses ‘the garrulous āstikas’ who deceive the fools by saying what does not exist, exists and revile ‘the nāstikas who speak the truth’.’ Mahāmoha then challenges if anyone has seen the soul different from the body (Act 2 verse 17). Here nāstika stands for materialism and nothing else. Kṛṣṇamiśra includes among the nāstikas, besides the philosophical schools, some religious communities or sects that he considered to be non-vedic (Kāpālikas, for example. Act 2 p.74ff and Act 5 p.126). His mention of Patañjali’s ‘Mahābhāṣya and other śāstras’ in the list of philosophical schools (Sāmkhya, Nyāya, Kāṇāda and Mīmāṃsā) contending against thenāstikas (Act 5 verse 7) is highly intriguing. Kṛṣṇamiśra, however, treats the darśanas as allied to the worshippers of five cults (pañcopāsanā), such as, the Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas, Sauras, Gāṇapatyas and Śāktas (Act 5 p.124). Insofar as the āstika darśanas are derived from the Veda, notwithstanding their differences, they can unite to defeat the pāṣaṇḍa agamas, that include the Lokāyata, which is opposed to both the Vedic and the two non-Vedic systems (parāparapakṣa- virodhitayā) (Act 5 p.126).

Sāyaṇa-Mādhava in his doxographical work, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, too, it seems, followed the new meaning of nāstika, not the old. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī offers a neat list of six āstika and nāstika systems, each having six members. Previously only three systems, the Buddhists, the Jains, and materialists constituted the nāstikas. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī mentions four Buddhist systems of philosophy separately: Śūnyavāda (Mādhyamika), Kṣaṇikavāda (Yogācāra), Vāhyārthavāda (Sautrāntika) and Pratyakṣa-svalakṣaṇa (Vaibhāṣika), all belonging to the Saugata (Buddhist). Then he alludes to Dehātmavāda (Cārvāka), and finally Dehavyatirikta- dehapariṇāmātmavāda (Digambara Jain): evaṃ militvā nāstikānām ṣaṭprasthānāni (p.3).

Cimaṇṇabhaṭṭa too speaks of the same six in a different order of arrangement: Cārvāka, Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika and Ārhata. His understanding of nāstika is that it is non-Vedic (p.89).⁸ Let it be remembered that this new meaning was not accepted by anyone except the Vedists. The Jains and Buddhists continued to use the pair of words in the old, original sense as before.

ṣaṭ-tarkī

However, the concept of ṣaṭ-tarkī or ṣaṇmata is found much earlier (for further details see ^{Gerschheimer 2007}passim). Wilhelm ^{Halbfass (1988}) does not speak of it, as he does not care for the āstika-nāstika division. However, this division is of seminal importance. Apart from works of logic and poetics, some inscriptions found both in India and in abroad refer to ṣaṭ-tarkī. The first reference to it occurs in Jayantabhaṭṭa’s NM (Ch.1 p.9). There too we have a distinction made - or at least implied - between those systems adhering to the Veda (Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika) and those denying its authority (Jain, Buddhist, Cārvāka). Even then, the fact remains that long before Jayanta (ninth century) the distinction between the prevalent philosophical systems were current in south India. Maṇimēkalai (± 550 ce) records six systems that accept logic, namely Lokāyata, Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā (27.77-80). The notable absentees, as in many other accounts, are Vedānta, Yoga and Jainism. Since Sīthalai Sāttanār, author of the work, was a devout Buddhist, we are not to expect any division in terms of pro-Vedic and anti-Vedic. The author does not even use the words, āstika and nāstika, to signify belief and disbelief in the existence of the Other World or rebirth. The exponent of Lokāyata however, makes his position vis-à-vis rebirth quite clear as does Maṇimēkalai, the Buddhist princess (27.74-76). Apparently, the āstika-nāstika demarcation came into vogue later, most probably in or around the eighth century.

Strangely enough, Haribhadra, in spite of being a Jain, uses the term āstikavādinaḥ, ‘those who say it exists’ (ṢDSam v.78, p.299) to denote only four pro-Vedic systems, namely, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā. The account of materialism (Lokāyata, also called the view of the Cārvākas in verse 85, begins with: ‘At first the own form of the nāstika is being said,’ prathamaṃ nāstika- svarῡpam ucyate (p.300)). In all probability Haribhadra took the word nāstika to mean a denier of the Other World, not a reviler of the Veda, for the new meaning of nāstika would make both Buddhism and Jainism to belong to the nāstika category. This is how the Cārvākas right from the eighth century earned four designations: cārvāka, nāstika, bārhaspatya, and lokāyata. Śaṅkara (ninth century) in his gloss on Kaṭha Upaniṣad (KaṭhUp) 2.3.12 speaks of the nāstikavādin (he who says (it) does not exist) and astitva-vādinaḥ (those who say (it) exists). The distinction between the two, however, was not introduced by him. It was already current at least a century before.

Materialism vis-à-vis Dharmaśāstra

Although no definite date can be suggested when the division between the āstika and the nāstika systems was first made, it continued to be employed in later times. It was in the eighth century when the Cārvāka/Lokāyata had been clearly identified as a nāstika system, not only in the brahmanical tradition (either in the sense of its antiOther World or anti-Vedic credentials, or both) but in the Buddhist and Jain traditions as well. Materialism was isolated and identified as a system of philosophy, whether pre-Cārvāka or Cārvāka, which was to be combated and condemned. The moot question is: how could such terms as āstika and nāstika, belonging to Dharmaśāstra, make its way into Mokṣaśāstra, which is another name for darśana? Add to this another question: Why such a professedly atheistic system as Sāṃkhya escape censure from the law-makers and continued to be counted among the six orthodox darśanas? Of course, there is one mitigating factor: Sāṃkhya never went against the inviolability of the Veda, since it accepted word (śabda) or verbal testimony as an instrument of cognition, which neither the Buddhists and Jains nor the Cārvākas did. The same applies to Mīmāṃsā, a system of philosophy that was thoroughly Vedic and yet atheistic. As to the other systems, although there is no reference to God or gods in the list of categories (padārthas) as in Nyāya, rebirth (pretyabhāva) was there (see Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9), and could therefore be admitted as an orthodox system. The syncretic form of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was avowedly theistic (see Gopikamohan Bhattacharya passim), as was the other syncretic system, Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

Is there any relationship between the doctrine of rebirth (involving belief in the Other World), adherence to the Veda, and theism? Even if we leave the second out, the relationship between the first and the third is proven by Jayanta’s categorical declaration: ‘The reply to (the objection against the admission of God raised by) the Bārhaspatyas would simply be the establishment of paraloka’ (NM, Āhnika 3, p. 275. C/L p. 156), that is, when the Other World is established, the materialists’ objections are automatically rejected/refuted. Such was not the position of Yama in the Kaṭha Up when he, however reluctantly, responded to Naciketa’s questions. The threat of rebirth, going back to the abode of Yama repeatedly, is sounded first in this Upaniṣad (Kaṭha Up 1.2.6). Whitney perceptively observed that there is no trace of hell in the Hindu religion of this period, ‘but to a repeated return to earthly existence. Transmigration, then, is not the fate of all, but only of the unworthy’ (p.92).⁹ Later, in the Mbh we hear of the fearsome nature of hell portrayed in lurid colours (12.146.18, cf. 12.174.5. See ^{Bhattacharya 2009}/2011 p.46). The Purāṇas describe the hell in graphic details.

Was there any special reason - political, religious, or economic - that Dharmaśāstra was made to intrude in the domain of Mokṣaśāstra? Why do the Buddhists and the Jains join the brahmanical writers to attack materialism, whether Pre-Cārvāka or Cārvāka? One common ground of reproaching materialism is that it does not admit the Other World and secondarily, denies the doctrine of karman. These two are the main planks, not only of old brahmanism and Purāṇic Hinduism but also of Buddhism and Jainism (irrespective of many differences among themselves). The reason why the concepts of āstikya and nāstikya were foisted on philosophy must have been necessitated by some dire need. But the need was there, and that is why a purely religious issue was introduced in the study of darśana, which had been accepted in the framework of the four aims in life (catur varga). If Arthaśāstra is to deal with wealth, Kāmaśāstra (in a restricted sense, erotics) with desire, Dharmaśāstra with merit, Mokṣaśāstra would be associated with darśana. By cultivating darśana one shall earn spiritual freedom and escape from the cycle of rebirth. However, not any kind of darśana, but only those that admit the Veda as the Word of Words and the religious law-books, Smṛti as infallible, is to be approved. There were two fronts in which the battle was waging: in one front the materialists were the common enemy against which the brahmanical thinkers along with the Jains and Buddhists had built up a united front; in the second front the materialists, the Buddhists and the Jains were arrayed against all the pro-Vedic systems. Unless the picture is conceived in this way the division of darśanas into āstika and nāstika (originally used as substantives but later as adjectives) remains inexplicable.

Vedicization of darsanas

The Vedicization of the darśanas was most probably necessitated by the desire to preserve the system of caste and four stages of life (Varṇa-āśrama-dharma). The powers that be were threatened by the advent and increase of such ‘heretical’ communities as the Jain, the Buddhist and, last but not least, the materialists. The one point common to these three was the non-observance of caste rules and even denunciation of the four-fold division of the people into Brahmaṇas (the priest class), Kṣatriyas (the warrior class), Vaiśyas (the agriculturist and the trading class), and Śūdras (the working people). The maintenance of this social order was the basic need of the ruling power which adhered to brahmanism. The Itihāsas (the Rāmāyāṇa and the Mahābhārata) and the Purāṇas (legendary accounts) had been utilized to preach the merits of this caste system apart from or rather in addition to everything else that made the contents of these works, censure of the heretics constitute the leitmotif of these legendary accounts purporting to glorify the new gods that had come to be worshipped in place of Vedic sacrificial rites, be it Viṣṇu or Śiva or the mother goddess (Devī).

R.C. Hazra was no radical, yet he understood the purpose behind the composition of the Purāṇas better than many. ‘In order to warn the people against violating the rules of the Varṇāśrama dharma,’ Hazra said, ‘numerous stories have been fabricated to show the result of violation [of the rules of the rites according to each caste and each state of being]’ (1940 pp.234-235. Emphasis added.)

The darśanas too were made to toe this line. What was enforced was, however, not the devotion to any god or goddess but to the Veda itself. By the time the philosophical systems had been given their shapes in sūtra form (the base text) that opened room for further commentaries and sub-commentaries, the demand for adherence to the Veda had been made and complied with. It so happen that in place of ṣaṭ-tarkī, the āstika /nāstika division was made to play a new role. Instead of the older meaning of the terms (affirming or denying the Other World) a new meaning (adherence or non-adherence to the Veda) was introduced and established. This interpretation, however, was current only in the brahmanical sphere. The Buddhists and the Jains continued to cling to the older meaning. However, that did not affect the so-called orthodox tradition.

Thus, there was a political necessity to enforce the Varṇa-āśrama system. At first in north India and then, over time, it was transmitted to the south.

One question, however, may appear inexplicable. When the Vedic rites had already become a matter of the past, when very few people, except the kings and rich citizens could afford to perform Vedic rites, why was the Veda projected as the ultimate authority over everything? The answer lies in the fact that the Dharmaśāstras drew their clout from the Veda. This is why Manu does not forget to mention śāstra (Dharmaśāstra) along with śruti (2.10-11 and 12.106).¹⁰ It is not for nothing that Rāma is made to caution Bharata against the lokāyatika brāhmaṇas , who, Rāma complains, “Even though there are principal religious law-books, these dimwits, having recourse to sophistical intelligence, talk rot” (Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, 94.32-33 (critical edition); Vulgate, 100.38-39).

Similarly, we find a jackal in the Mahābhārata confessing to Indra: ‘[In my previous birth] I was a pseudo-scholar, a reasoner and a reviler of the Veda. I was addicted to meaningless sophistical logic (or sophistical logic without objects). I was the spokesman of rationalism in the assembly, abused the twice-born (brahmanas), outshouted them and condemned brahma (Vedas) and sacrifice. I was a nāstika, a doubter and a fool considering myself learned. Oh brahmana, as a result of all this, I am (re)-born as a jackal’ (Śāntiparvan, 174.45-47(critical edition)). E. W. ^{Hopkins (1901}/1996, p. 89) refers to Anuśāsanaparvan, 37.12-14, in which the ‘telling phrase’, tarkavidyāṃ… nirarthikām, is repeated. In fact, the same set of words, namely, vedanindakaḥ, ānvīkṣikī, hetuvāda, paṇḍitaka, etc., as occurring in the Śāntiparvan passage, is echoed in the three Anuśāsanaparvan verses. (This is one of the many instances of “self-quotation” in the Mbh).

Thus the Puruṣasūkta of the Ṛgveda (10.90, particularly ṛk 11), via both Dharmaśāstra and Mokṣaśāstra, provided sanction to the status quo ante desired by the State. As Kauṭilya declares: ‘The law laid down in the Trayī is beneficial, as it prescribed the respective duties of the four varṇas and the four stages of life,’ eṣa trayīdharmaś caturnāṃ varṇānām āśramāṇāṃ ca svadharmasthāpanādaupakārikaḥ (1.3.4).

Appendix A