Emergence of the Community Police of Santa Fe and reform process in security

As discussed in the introduction, an exponential increase in crime and homicides and the participation of police officers in criminal organizations (Tognolli case), as well as the increased activity of criminal gangs (the case of Los Monos) characterized the implementation of the community police.

Concerning the increase in the rate of crimes against property, in 2007, the province had 2004 crimes per 100 thousand inhabitants⁴, a number that rose to 2206 in 2014.⁵ In 2011, the homicide rate in the province increased to 9 per 100 thousand inhabitants, in 2012, 13.1 in 2013, and 13.6 in 2014.⁶ However, to have a broader picture, we have to look at the homicide rate in the two most populous cities, Santa Fe and Rosario. In 2011, in Santa Fe, the rate reached 16.7 per 100 thousand inhabitants, 21.7 in 2012, in 2013, and 32.8 in 2014.⁷ A similar evolution can be observed in Rosario, which reached a rate of 14.5 per 100 thousand inhabitants in 2011, 16.2 in 2012, 23 in 2013, and 21.1 in 2014.⁸ It should be noted that for the period 2011-2014 it is estimated that the homicide rate at the national level was 7.6 per 100 thousand inhabitants; thus, the rates at the provincial level far exceeded the national average.⁹

Secondly, it is worth mentioning an occurrence that drove to an unprecedented political crisis in the government of the Civic and Social Progressive Front (FPCyS), the arrest of Hugo Tognoli, chief of police of the Province of Santa Fe, in March 2013. The federal justice finally sentenced him, in 2015, to six years in prison for complicity and connivance with drug trafficking.¹⁰

Lastly, the analyzed period was characterized by an upsurge in the actions of the narco-criminal gangs, especially in the city of Rosario, which in large part explains the increase in the homicide rate during those years. The paradigmatic case would be that of the band Los Monos, an organization that set up a millionaire business based on the production and sale of cheap cocaine, adapted to the popular market.¹¹ The importance of this band is that they devised a business model characterized by the dissemination of more than 200 bunkers to sell the drug and protect themselves from their competitors with those armored constructions that were in sight of everyone, including the police. The extreme violence that they spread through Rosario -especially after the death of their leader, Claudio Cantero, alias El Pájaro (May 26, 2013)- was always used to maintain the drug trafficking business.¹²

Faced with this situation, the government of Santa Fe developed a series of measures to change the image of the management of Governor Antonio Bonfatti and, especially, that of the provincial police. In November 2012, the management of the Civic and Social Progressive Front (FPCyS) promoted the Democratic Security Plan, structured from ten "actions or objectives" in security policies: 1) the creation of a new police force based on the segmentation of its functions and through regionalization; 2) the implementation of community security experiences; 3) the exponential increase in police equipment, infrastructure, and technology; 4) the transformation of curricula and police training; 5) the implementation of centers and an Integrated Complaint System (911); 6) the management of complex crimes; 7) the creation of a sports safety area; 8) the creation of the Road Safety Agency; 9) the professionalization of prison staff; and 10) the creation of the Provincial Security Council (González, 2014).

In December of 2012, with the enactment of Law 13297 and Decree 3973/2012 -which promulgates the previous regulations with amendments- the "emergency in matters of public security" is declared throughout the provincial territory for the term of eighteen months, "with the primary purpose of achieving and guaranteeing the integral protection of people's lives and property." The regulation empowers the executive power to readjust the resources and dispose of everything necessary to restructure and organize the provincial police into smaller territorial units, create a Unified Tactical Body and a provincial General Directorate of Investigations, establish district security officers, promote citizen participation in the selection of authorities, increase the interference of local governments, and take all of the necessary administrative measures so that the areas of personnel, logistics, and management of administrative proceedings are directly dependent on the Ministry of Security. It also establishes the increase in the number of positions of the permanent personnel plant of the Police of the Province of Santa Fe of the Ministry of Security to four thousand persons.¹³

Law 13408 of 2014, modifies Article 2, clause C of the previously mentioned regulations and stipulates that applicants who have completed the first year of the police career program may be incorporated as personnel of the Police of the Province of Santa Fe, thus, entering in the rank of non-commissioned officer of the Police. Previously, Law 12333 of 2004, created by the Institute of Public Security (ISEP in Spanish) established that to apply for admission to the police force, applicants had to complete a career program as a security assistant, which has a minimum duration of two years. In other words, Law 13408 the training period of the aspirants entering the security corps was shortened; in only one year they would be able to realize "preventive functions in police stations and public places"¹⁴

Within this normative framework, a process of reform in the matter of security begins. In the first place, a process of regionalization and decentralization of the Santa Fe Police is promoted, starting with the creation of five regional general directorates:

Region 1. Reconquista node

Region 2. Rafaela node

Region 3. Santa Fe node

Region 4. Rosario node

Region 5. Venado Tuerto node

All of the nodes functioned under the administrative and functional dependency of the Secretariat of Public Security, managed and commanded by the Police Headquarters of the Province of Santa Fe. The objective of this reform was "to decompress the central administration, favoring more agile resolutions and greater proximity with the citizenship."¹⁵ In this sense, it was sought to create five police headquarters, with head offices in the city seat of the corresponding node in each region, with five territorial directors of the Ministry of Security (political heads of the Police).¹⁶

Besides this process of regionalization and decentralization, another of fragmentation or sectorization of the Santa Fe Police can be observed in the creation of four police structures: The Road Safety Police (PSV), the Investigation Police (PDI), the Tactical Action Police (PAT), and the Community Police. It should be noted that the management and operational coordination of each of these were exercised by four different general directions and four directions of regional representation in each of the nodes.¹⁷

In such a way, the civil and strategic administration of the Santa Fe Police was enforced, from the subordination of the institution to the public safety directives formulated by the governmental authorities.

Design of the Community Police of Santa Fe

The creation of a police force with a community profile was not an initiative of the Provincial Police; it was the result of Raul Lamberto's procurement in the Ministry of Security of Santa Fe. The objective was to create a differentiated police force that, through a monitoring and accountability strategy with citizens, that could eventually yield positive results in the form of a surveillance profile, which could later be extended to all the provincial police. However, there is no regulatory framework regulating the provincial Community Police and establishing its objectives, functions, and organizational structure; it was created through a ministerial resolution whose text does not detail this information. Decree 2710/2013 of creation of the Provincial Proximity Police Office, establishes that the Community Police, "to optimize the quality of the public service that public safety represents, has the objective of approaching

the neighbor, the families, integrating into a social nucleus in which it acquires respect and trust to strengthen its social ties with the community it serves, restoring the relationship of trust, confidence, and cordiality that should exist between citizens and the members of society that have been educated, trained, and taught in the work of caring for them and protecting social peace.

Official documents state that the community police is characterized by 1) having a territorial scope of action limited to a given territory; 2) establishing close links with citizens, through the understanding of their environment and their problems; 3) developing preventive and proactive police activity; 4) establishing alliances with local authorities for the adequate development of crime prevention and violence activities, as well as the community services assumed; 5) having functional autonomy within the legally assigned functions and the framework of the strategies and plans defined jointly with the community in which it operates; 6) having public accountability for their actions (Dirección Provincial de Policía de Proximidad, 2014).

From the interviews carried out with the different officials, it is clear that the community agent should have a leadership role and act as mediator and representative of the State. The agent should thoroughly understand the social fabric, as well as other public departments to cooperate in the fulfillment of the unmet community demands concerning public services, and aspects like neighborhood lighting, weeding, and others. The objective was for citizens to return to the public space to increase social control and reduce crime.

In the neighborhood of Rosario, where the first community experience would be implemented, Governor Antonio Bonfatti decided that it would be in Las Flores. From the interviewees' perspective, the choice of the neighborhood had a symbolic meaning; it demonstrated the provincial state's decision to recover the territory in which the criminal band, Los Monos, acted as a "para-State," providing services and protection to the population of the neighborhood.

Regarding the distribution of human resources, it was established that 40 community policemen would be assigned to the mentioned territory (28 cadets graduated from the ISEP in August 2013 and 12 police officers with no more than 5 years of experience), one for each "micro-district" (every 400 meters), who would have to carry out patrolling in a straight line for six (6) hours a day.

To this end, a pre-selection was made among the graduated cadets. During the months prior to the implementation of the first experience, a course was offered at the ISEP through an "Intensive Course in Community Policing Skills" with a duration of 30 hours. In addition, an intensive mediation workshop was held on "community facilitators for the resolution of conflicts," with a duration of 60 hours. The workshop's faculty was integrated by professional mediators of the Provincial Directorate of Dejudicialization of the Solution of the Interpersonal Conflicts of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Dirección Provincial de Policía de Proximidad, 2014). Concerning, the election of police officers who had just completed their training courses, one of the interviewees pointed out that this was intended to allow them to enter the new device with the least possible introspection of the police culture so that they could internalize the new community profile.

Upon arriving at the neighborhood, the community agents would have to introduce themselves to each neighbor of the assigned "micro-neighborhood" (microbarrio) give them their card, which would include their email and official cell phone, and explain what their functions would be in terms of security. On the other hand, one of the official documents states that

it would be valuable if the community police officer, through a non-suggestive circular dialogue, could access information about the resident, including social, economic, and cultural characteristics, and ascertaining his personal opinion about the neighborhood's security. This information will allow the community police, among other things, to make an accurate diagnosis about their objective. (Dirección Provincial de Policía de Proximidad, 2014)

It was also stated, on that occasion, that the community police officers should deliver brochures on the program to the neighbors and a manual of self-protection practices. They should take advantage of "this occasion to make them aware of their new role as facilitators of consensus relations of preventive situations of violence and crime" (Dirección Provincial de Policía de Proximidad, 2014). In this sense, they would have to make recommendations to the inhabitants on situational crime controls and the adoption of measures to reduce the criminal opportunities.

It was also considered important that the community police meet with other actors, entities or institutions (schools, neighborhoods, clubs, health centers, local authorities, churches, and businesses) to build a "strategic alliance with the community of their intervention" (Dirección Provincial de Policía de Proximidad, 2014).

The agents would be distinguished from the other members of the Santa Fe Police by orange-colored epaulets and would carry their regulatory weapon when carrying out their daily activities. Likewise, the decentralization of the taking of complaints was raised as a fundamental issue, for which the community police officers would carry in their tactical belt a fanny pack with standardized forms of complaints and manifestations. However, the complaints would have to be formalized at the police station. The community police would have to follow up on them to advise the citizen of their progress.

Additionally, the creation of a physical structure called the Community Police House (CPC) was promoted, where it was forbidden to lodge detainees or carry out briefs. These spaces were architecturally and conceptually designed as meeting points for residents and community agents. Here, the head of the police center and administrative, technical support would carry out their work. The first would have as functions to audit the patrolling of the agents, control the quality of the police service, and establish and impart general lines of community action in its center, all the while, observing the "microscale" defined by each community police officer in conjunction with the neighbors. The objective was the establishment of a bottom-up public policy, unlike the traditional structure in which the political officer sets the agenda for the population.

The primary responsibility of the administrative, technical support was to maintain permanent communication, via radio, with the community agents performing their patrol work, as well as receiving requests and responding to any type of requirement formulated in person at the CPC by the neighbors, and refer the cases to be presented to the pertinent offices or organizations. However, if neighbors approached the CPC to issue complaints, this officer would be unable to accept them; instead, the officer would refer them to the nearest police station or contact the community police agent assigned to the area to process them.

The community police officers' performance was evaluated by presenting, within the first two months of each year, a management report to the Collective Working Group, giving an account of the activities carried out and the results obtained in the previous year, listing the resources used and the obstacles and issues faced and the measures taken to overcome them. The report should also include suggestions and define the guidelines for action to improve the agent's performance in the following year. It was projected that the management report would be presented at an annual public hearing in the respective "micro-neighborhood" and it would be available to any neighbor. Moreover, once a year, the community police should conduct a survey of each neighbor on the level of satisfaction of the expectations generated around the public community police service in the "micro-neighborhood."

Problematization of the design of the Community Police of Santa Fe

Our attention is drawn, first of all, to the absence of a regulation that regulates the operation and defines the organizational structure of the Community Police of Santa Fe. Unlike the Police of Investigations (PDI) and the Police of Tactical Action (PAT) that were created through two extensive and detailed decrees, the Community Police was established through a ministerial resolution, lacking in details on the frame and function of each area, as well as the agent selection criteria, modality of work, and other necessary information.

Based on information obtained in one of the interviews, the creation of a functional structure was repeatedly tested, but these projects never prospered. Therefore, its structure continued to function de facto, with a structure made up of a director; two sub-directors, one for the north-center and another for the south area; a legal counsel division in charge of operations, logistics, information analysis, and protocol; a police chief; and a deputy chief for each of the five regions (which included the Community Police Houses, also formed by a chief, a deputy chief, a service chief, a guard chief, foot and motorized officers, and some transcribers).

The absence of a table of professional categories, the non-definition of the community police's functions, and missions is not a minor issue. From an administrative point of view, the staff members lose their right to move ahead in their careers because they do not know how to ascend; this gives rise to the use of any type of discretion when assigning the available positions. Similarly, because each area's functions are not legally defined, the staff’s duties can be modified continuously. This could imply, for example, that police activity can change radically from day to day without any type of impediment. Regulations protect institutions and allow them to prosper over time.

Some of the issues pertaining to the functioning of the community police are highlighted below. The first one concerns the tendering of complaints. Although the community agent was allowed to receive the complaint, its formalization could only take place in the neighborhood police station and not in the Community Police House. An official interviewed justified this issue by pointing out that, from management, they wanted to avoid competition between the different police bodies or overlap activities. They knew that the traditional police would be resentful towards the community police because of the process they wanted to impose. The idea was to limit the community agent to recording the "incident," encouraging the neighbor to offer his testimony to attain first-hand information concerning the criminal situation in the territory. The police station would later summon the issuing citizen to expand on the incident and initiate the investigation and the prosecutor's intervention. We consider this procedure inimical, as the population was well aware that neighborhood police stations were suspected of collusion with the drug gangs.

Similarly, in cases of complex crime or high violence, the Community Police had to resort to the traditional police or the National Gendarmerie because they lacked the tools and training to deal with this type of problem. As we noted earlier, the Community Police was considered a manager, referring citizens to different public agencies to try to resolve their unmet. In this sense, if encountered with a situation of violence, they were compelled to request the intervention of the federal force or the police station.

Regarding this last issue, a "schizophrenic" logic by the provincial state is observed, when two diametrically opposed logics are set to intervene in the same territory. The first, community policing -which promotes citizen participation- is a form of preventive police activity that emphasizes the role of the police as a mediator in resolving community conflicts; the second, traditional control, which, as ^{Saín (2010)} points out, is characterized by the full occupation of the territory by a large number of officers carrying out surveillance and control duties through reactive interventions that seek the "saturation" of the police presence in the public ways.

From this last logic, the community is nothing more than a secondary and passive actor or a mere scenario in whose center the dialectic of war develops which, within the framework of this military vision of security, has served to justify and legitimize all forms of violent police activity.

The design process of the community police was marked by a high degree of improvisation. For instance, the selection of the Las Flores neighborhood to conduct the pilot tests was justified by the Civic and Social Progressive Front (FPCyS) because it wanted to demonstrate that the provincial state was not absent but actively involved in the problem of insecurity in a territory socked by the actions of the Los Monos group, despite the fact that, as we pointed out earlier, community officers are not prepared to handle cases of complex crimes. In this regard, ^{Tudela Poblete (2008)} points out that there is evidence that prevention programs will most likely be successful and work better in communities that need them the least, that is, in the most empowered and organized. Indeed, evidence shows that in communities with severe problems, the efforts and difficulties for the implementation of innovative strategies are greater and more complex and, typically, success is dubious (^{Sherman et al., 1998}, p. 7). In brief, the selection of the places where the execution of these programs is commenced cannot be capricious.

Naturally, the selection should obey to objective and established criteria, according to duly designed variables, such as socioeconomic criteria, crime levels, which should be the most critical. The selected districts should represent high, medium, and low-income sectors, in addition to having high, medium, and low levels of crime, making it possible to obtain the results of the proximity police program in districts with diverse social and criminal situations. These results should also be compared with control areas with similar characteristics but without such a program (^{Frühling, 2003}).

Lastly, we consider that those in charge of designing the community police were unfamiliar with the social policies that the municipality was developing in the city of Rosario. Some of the roles assigned to the agents overlapped with programs that were already being implemented by the local government, for example, concerning the instruction in trades for unemployed neighborhood youth or regarding issues of gender violence, which local government, conjointly with civil society organizations, had already been addressing.