Resumo

URUENA-SANCHEZ, Mario  e  DERMER-WODNICKY, Miriam. The Counterinsurgency Strategy in the Colombian Armed Conflict from Defensive Realism (1962-1966). rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur. [online]. 2020, vol.15, n.2, pp.43-56.  Epub 25-Set-2020. ISSN 1909-3063.  https://doi.org/10.18359/ries.4495.

This article starts from the following question: How can a weak threat become an actual threat, even in the absence of a specific one? To answer it, it is hypothesized that the factors that could lead to this, in the case of the implementation of the Alliance for Progress, are: 1) the opposing views between military and diplomatic officials; 2) the conveyance of biased information by decision makers from an allied country, and 3) the influence of pre-existing belief systems. The innovative approach proposed uses the theory of defensive realism to assess the role of both material capacities and decision-makers' perceptions in creating an actual threat from a weak one. It is concluded that cognitive aspects may result in overestimation of a threat due to the wrong arrangement of material capacities.

Palavras-chave : Alliance for Progress; United States-Colombia relations; defensive realism; Laso Plan; Marquetalia Operation.

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