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Revista Logos Ciencia & Tecnología

Print version ISSN 2145-594XOn-line version ISSN 2422-4200

Rev. logos cienc. tecnol. vol.17 no.2 Bogotá May/Aug. 2025  Epub Aug 01, 2025

https://doi.org/10.22335/rlct.v17i2.2127 

Artículo de investigación

Drones and fifth generation warfare: humanitarian implications in the Colombian conflict

Drones y guerras de quinta generación: implicaciones humanitarias en el conflicto colombiano

Andrés Eduardo Fernández-Osorio* 
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0643-0258

* Escuela de Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Asuntos Jurídicos del Ejército, andresfernandezosorio@cedoc.edu.co https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0643-0258 Bogotá; Colombia.


ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of drones and other disruptive technologies on the Colombian conflict within the framework of fifth-generation warfare (5GW). By analyzing technologies such as surveillance drones, it explores their influence on conflict dynamics, including the blurring of lines between combatants and civilians, the intensification of information warfare, and the generation of fear. The paper highlights humanitarian implications such as indiscriminate attacks, loss of privacy, forced displacement, and their psychological effects. It also addresses the role of technology in documenting human rights violations, alongside evidence preservation, and the ethical challenges that arise from this. Key aspects of 5GW, such as ambiguous boundaries, information warfare, and asymmetry, are analyzed in relation to drone used by state and non-state actors. Ethical dilemmas surrounding remotely piloted and potentially autonomous drones are discussed, highlighting the challenges of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the imperative of human control over the use of lethal force. The article concludes with recommendations to strengthen legal frameworks, promote transparency, counter disinformation, and enhance civilian protection, advocating for a comprehensive strategy for this era of technological disruption.

Keywords: armed conflict; Colombia; drone warfare; fifth-generation warfare; International Humanitarian Law

RESUMEN

Este artículo examina el impacto de los drones y otras tecnologías disruptivas en el conflicto colombiano, en el marco de las guerras de quinta generación (G5G). Mediante el análisis de tecnologías como los drones de vigilancia, se explora su influencia en la dinámica del conflicto, incluyendo la difuminación de las fronteras entre combatientes y civiles, la intensificación de la guerra de la información y la generación de miedo. El documento destaca las implicaciones humanitarias, como los ataques indiscriminados, la pérdida de privacidad, el desplazamiento forzado y sus efectos psicológicos. También aborda el papel de la tecnología en la documentación de violaciones de derechos humanos, junto con la preservación de la evidencia, y los desafíos éticos que surgen de esto. Se analizan aspectos clave de las G5G, como los límites ambiguos, la guerra de la información y la asimetría, en relación con el uso de drones por parte de actores estatales y no estatales. Se discuten los dilemas éticos en torno a los drones pilotados en forma remota y potencialmente autónomos, destacando los desafíos del Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH) y la necesidad del control humano sobre el uso de la fuerza letal. El artículo concluye con recomendaciones para fortalecer los marcos legales, promover la transparencia, contrarrestar la desinformación y mejorar la protección de los civiles, respaldando por una estrategia integral para esta era de disrupción tecnológica.

Palabras clave: Colombia; conflicto armado; Derecho Internacional Humanitario; guerra con drones; guerras de quinta generación

Introduction

The context of contemporary armed conflicts has undergone a radical transformation in recent years, driven by the proliferation of disruptive technologies. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), commonly referred to as "drones," now occupy a central place. For instance, the war between Ukraine and Russia, has demonstrated the evolution of warfare, in which increasingly complex war scenarios require sophisticated weapon systems and autonomous aircraft to play a crucial role in meeting future operational challenges (Birkeland, 2018, p. 73).

Robinson argues that the increasing use of drones in modern warfare has contributed to an equalizing effect on military capabilities (2022, p. 83) as drones are less expensive than manned aircraft, require less training, and do not need the same infrastructure. Additionally, they are easier to transport and conceal, which reduces the risk to military units or crews. These factors make drones an effective tool for states that cannot afford sizable conventional air forces, as their low cost allows them to be purchased in sufficient numbers to overwhelm air defenses.

In the Colombian context, marked by decades of conflict and a quest for elusive peace, drone use has progressively intensified over the past two years, raising crucial questions regarding their humanitarian implications. This phenomenon is part of what is known as fifth-generation warfare (5GW), characterized by blurred boundaries between combatants and non-combatants, the intensive use of information as a weapon, and the manipulation of public perception. As described by Krishnan (2022, p. 16), "advances in biotechnology and nanotechnology would drive 5GW [and] these technologies could enable super-empowered individuals or small groups to pursue ideological or personal objectives independent of nations but leveraging state-like capabilities".

5GW represents a challenge to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which seeks to protect civilians during armed conflict. Drones, with their remote surveillance and attack capabilities, can exacerbate the challenge of distinguishing between legitimate military targets from civilians, increasing the risk of indiscriminate attacks (Rushby, 2017). Furthermore, their use in information warfare and the generation of constant fear of weaponized drones has a "potential psychosocial impact [...] on operators, target populations and communities" (Hijazi et al., 2019, p. 1285). Additionally, as suggested by Pino & Pettigrew (2024, p. 1), regarding UAS use by Ukraine and Russia, "[they are driving] far more [fear and anxiety in soldiers] than combatants [did] in previous conflicts, [...] because of their pervasiveness, distinctive sounds, and high-profile exposure on social media".

In Colombia, drone use has been documented in various forms, from surveillance of remote areas to targeted attacks against armed groups, raising the need to critically examine the humanitarian implications of these technologies within the framework of 5GW. This article argues that the intensifying use of drones, particularly commercially available models adapted by non-state actors, represents a pivotal manifestation of 5GW within the unique context of the Colombian conflict. It contends that this drone proliferation not only transforms tactical engagements but fundamentally exacerbates existing humanitarian challenges by further eroding the clear separation between military targets and the civilian populations, amplifying information warfare, and deepening the psychological impact on vulnerable groups.

By analyzing the specific ways drones interact with 5GW characteristics in Colombia, examining documented humanitarian consequences, and considering the ethical dilemmas posed, this paper aims to provide concrete recommendations for mitigating harm and strengthening adherence to IHL amidst this technological disruption. This analysis will proceed by defining 5GW and linking it to the use of drones and then detailing the disruptive technologies impacting the Colombian case, while exploring the multifaceted humanitarian implications. It also discusses ethical challenges, including potential future autonomous systems, and concludes with recommendations for national and international actors.

Drones and Fifth-Generation Warfare (5GW)

The 5GW concept describes a war paradigm where traditional borders fade, and information emerges as the primary weapon. 5GW represents a noteworthy evolutionary conflict that involves blurring lines between combatants and non-combatants, the central role of information and cyberspace as battlefields, sophisticated psychological operations aimed at influencing perceptions and behaviors, and the exploitation of social vulnerabilities. In this context, drones are not merely tactical tools but key elements that intensify the disruptive dynamics of this new form of warfare.

The ability of drones to conduct remote attacks and surveillance across significant distances effectively dissolves traditional geographic boundaries in the Colombian conflict, rendering virtually any location potentially vulnerable to attack or surveillance (Rushby, 2017). Unlike conventional ground offensives, drone operations are not constrained by physical terrain or the need to deploy troops, allowing armed actors to project power and influence over a wider area, distorting the common understanding of safe and contested zones. This dissolution of geographical boundaries is accompanied by the erosion of an even more significant principle for IHL: the distinction between military and civilian identities. The increasing use of commercially available, easily acquired drones by non-state actors further complicates the clear identification of combatants and the enforcement of traditional rules of engagement, since these operators can blend in with the civilian population before and after launching an attack or conducting surveillance (Farrow, 2016).

A defining characteristic of 5GW may be leading to a fusion of military and civilian identities in conflict zones, with drones intensifying this ambiguity through their capacity for ubiquitous surveillance and selective attacks, thereby increasing the risk of collateral damage. Communities - predominantly indigenous and peasant - are caught in a crossfire, where identifying armed actors becomes a complex task. In Colombia, this ambiguity is amplified by non-state actors employing commercially available, readily drones, allowing operators to blend seamlessly with civilian populations both before and after conducting surveillance or attacks. This operational flexibility, enabled by low-cost technology accessible to small groups, directly reflects Krishnan's characterization of 5GW, which leverages accessible technology to provide state-like capabilities independent of nation-states.

Alongside this ambiguity in the physical realm, drones serve as catalysts for another central feature of 5GW: the instrumentalization of information. Information and disinformation warfare constitute another distinctive feature of 5GW (Turunen, 2018), with drones equipped with high-resolution cameras and advanced sensors serving as tools to collect and disseminate both accurate and manipulated information. In the Colombian context, the proliferation of fake news and online propaganda (Cerdán-Martínez and Seni-Medina, 2024; López Gill, 2023), sometimes amplified by images and videos obtained by drones, has exacerbated polarization and mistrust, specifically because the ability of drones to generate striking visual information enables the construction of narratives that influence public perception of the conflict. The use of drones by groups such as FARC dissidents to film attacks for propaganda purposes (Jaramillo, 2025), disseminated via social media, exemplifies the 5GW tactic of weaponizing information to influence perception, generate fear, and potentially undermine state legitimacy, thereby directly impacting the Colombian information landscape (RFI, 2024).

The manipulation of perceptions through information warfare is intrinsically linked to a key aspect of 5GW leveraged by drones: psychological warfare. Psychological warfare - which includes the deliberate generation of fear - is also a central element of 5GW, as the constant presence of drones, whether visible or imperceptible, creates anxiety and vulnerability in communities (Herdel et al., 2021; Naeem et al., 2025). The constant buzzing of drones becomes a continuous reminder of the presence of war, affecting people's mental health and well-being as the fear of being monitored or attacked at any time creates a state of permanent alert, limiting freedom of movement and disrupting daily life. Even more concerning is the possibility of being attacked by such weapons without the means to defend oneself (Sankaran, 2024).

Drone facilitates asymmetric warfare. Non-state armed groups with limited resources

can acquire or manufacture drones to conduct attacks on strategic targets; such decentralization of power through violence poses a significant challenge to national security and regional stability. The relative ease with which drones can be obtained on the black market or homemade drones can be built increases the risk that these devices may fall into the hands of non-state actors with malicious intent. Understanding this interaction is crucial for addressing the humanitarian and security challenges posed by the use of drones in the context of 5GW. The need for a clear regulatory framework, effective oversight mechanisms, and strategies to counter disinformation is becoming increasingly urgent.

A comparative analysis of drone use in other conflicts worldwide offers valuable lessons and insights for the Colombian context. Drone use varies significantly across conflicts, influenced by factors such as the actors involved, the types of drones available, and the overall strategic context. In counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, such as those conducted by countries including the United States, Israel, United Kingdom, China, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkey, and Turkmenistan (Cronin, 2021; Okpaleke et al., 2023; Schwartz et al., 2022), drones have proven to be practical tools for Intelligence gathering and targeted strikes, albeit with limitations and the need for complementary tactics (Farrow, 2016). The adoption of drone technology by Colombian non-state actors enables them to project force and conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in ways that previously required significantly greater resources, embodying the asymmetric leveling effect noted in modern conflicts and posing novel challenges to conventional state security forces within the framework of 5GW.

The concept of 5GW is evident in other global conflicts as a mutation of warfare and contemporary threats across criminal and terrorist multi-domain (Barrero-Barrero & Alvarez-Calderon, 2022). A key case study is the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, cited as a clear example of the transition to 5GW due to its combination of large-scale drone use, cyber operations, and information warfare with cyber operations and information warfare (Angelov, 2022; Petrosyan, 2024). In that conflict, military-grade drones played a decisive role in Azerbaijan's victory, demonstrating high effectiveness in penetrating Armenia's air defenses and neutralizing ground targets (Farrow, 2016; Hecht, 2022). The conflict underscored the importance of synchronized drone operations and electronic warfare capabilities. This scenario, however, contrasts with the conflict in Ukraine, where the use of drones, both military and commercially adapted, has been more varied, and their role has been less decisive due to the widespread countermeasures used by both sides (Rickli & Mantellassi, 2024; Topor, 2023).

The global trend toward integrating drones into military strategies, often within the framework of 5GW, underscores the need for Colombia to proactively address the challenges and opportunities posed by this technology (LISA Institute, 2024). The experiences of other nations in engaging with drone warfare can offer valuable insights and best practices for Colombia as it navigates its unique security challenges. There are notable similarities between the use of drones in the Colombian conflict and their deployment in other contexts. For instance, the reliance on low-cost commercial drones by non-state actors in Colombia resembles trends observed during the early stages of the Ukrainian conflict (Chávez & Swed, 2023; Kunertova, 2023). Additionally, the lack of sophisticated air defense capabilities in some areas of Colombia could render them vulnerable to drone attacks, similar to the situation faced by Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh (Marín Delgado, 2021). Therefore, the Colombian military and government must learn from the experiences of other nations in developing and implementing comprehensive counter-drone strategies to prepare to address emerging threats to both regional and global security (Barrero-Barrero & Velásquez-Fandiño, 2022). The Colombian military's active preparation for drone threats and its acquisition of technology to counter them (Rodríguez Álvarez, 2024) aligns with lessons drawn from other conflicts, highlighting the need for robust air defenses and counter-drone measures.

Drones and Disruptive Technologies in Colombia

The Colombian conflict, a site of historical tensions and multiple actors, has undergone a notable transformation with the progressive incorporation of disruptive technologies and their impact on human security and multidimensional security aimed at protecting human rights (Acevedo-Navas et al., 2022). Disruptive technologies, which refer to innovations that fundamentally alter markets and business models, are particularly relevant in the context of war. For example, the emergence of drones has revolutionized surveillance and attack tactics, challenging traditional conceptions of warfare.

Surveillance drones have enabled greater precision in intelligence gathering by facilitating the collection of real-time information in areas of difficult access; however, their constant presence creates a constant state of alert and vulnerability in communities. The information generated by these devices may produce behavioral data that expose populations with ancestrally inhabited territories to vulnerability (Schroeder & Panebianco, 2021).

The use of armed drones and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS), military systems capable of selecting and engaging targets without direct human intervention, marks a qualitative leap in the technological evolution of the conflict. With the apparent precision offered by these devices, the ability to carry out targeted attacks from a distance raise unprecedented ethical and legal dilemmas. Complicating the identification of legitimate combatants versus protected persons, a characteristic of 5GW, is exacerbated by the ability of drones to operate in ambiguity. The relative ease with which armed drones can be acquired or even hand-assembled, decentralizes the power of violence, allowing non-state actors to deploy capabilities previously exclusive to military forces around the world.

In the case of Colombia, the use of drones has seen a notable increase in recent years, with a reported total of 115 drone-related incidents in 2024 (Swissinfo, 2024a). Recent reports illustrate this trend alarmingly, showing that in the first half of 2024, a significant number of drone attacks were reported. For instance, it has been reported that dissidents from FARC's Central General Staff (EMC) had carried out 20 drone attacks in that period alone, causing casualties among both security forces and civilians (Patiño, 2024). Similar reports suggest that other terrorist groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN), are acquiring armed drone capabilities to support their attacks (Mazo González, 2025) as part of the ELN's strategy of unrestricted warfare (Villalba-Garcia et al., 2022). This conflict involves state and non-state actors seeking an advantage over more vigorous state opponents. This trend may indicate that illicit groups are employing a steady and increasing strategy involving disruptive technologies to reshape the conflict (Mazo González, 2024; Swissinfo, 2024b).

As reported by the Colombian Ministry of Defense, during 2025 only, the Colombian Armed Forces have suffered at least 54 attacks involving explosive-laden drones (Blanquicet, 2025b), and during 2024, in the Department of Valle del Cauca, the Army thwarted 28 drone attacks, and more than 700 explosive attacks (Villamil, 2024). These numbers suggest an increase in the use of drones for attacks by illegal armed groups, especially FARC dissidents (particularly EMC factions such as "Jaime Martínez" and "Dagoberto Ramos") and, to a lesser extent, the ELN. The most affected areas coincide with areas with a high presence of these groups and active conflict, such as the departments of Cauca, Norte de Santander, Arauca, and Caquetá, and the use of commercial drones (easily acquired) manually modified to carry explosive payloads (such as grenades or improvised explosives) is predominantly reported. In addition to direct attacks, drones are widely used by these groups for ISR of the terrain and law enforcement positions.

While some attacks have resulted in fatalities and injuries among law enforcement, many result in material damage or fail to achieve their objective; however, they pose a significant threat and demonstrate technological adaptation by armed groups. It is crucial to note that responsibility is often attributed by authorities or security analysis and may not be immediately confirmed by the groups or by conclusive judicial investigations. The convergence of these figures underscores a clear and significant trend toward the increasing use of drones as a tool of confrontation by various armed actors.

The fact that both military personnel and civilians are among the victims of these attacks (Agudelo, 2024; Duque et al., 2024; Semana, 2024) raises serious humanitarian concerns about the precision of the attacks and respect for the protection of the civilian population, fundamental principles of IHL. The proliferation and application of drone technology in the Colombian conflict are not isolated incidents but represent a transformation of warfare, going beyond traditional kinetic engagements and entailing profound and multifaceted humanitarian implications for civilians and the application of IHL.

Making the scenario more complicated, some evidence suggests a predominance of low-cost, commercial drones on the market, with minimal purchase restrictions. As reported by Duque et al. (2024), FARC dissidents are using commercial drones to drop grenades and carryout reconnaissance, and Patiño (2024) states that the drones used by dissidents are affordable and can be purchased online, mentioning the DJI Mini 4 Pro model as one of the most common. Similarly, research carried out independently by some organizations indicates that illegal armed groups are using over-the-counter drones to drop improvised explosives (Semana, 2024), and FARC dissidents are using common commercial drones to deploy homemade explosive devices costing less than $1,000 (Swissinfo, 2024b). These findings suggest that non-state armed groups in Colombia are primarily resorting to generic drone platforms, adapting them for military purposes due to their accessibility and low cost. The use of more sophisticated models, such as the DJI Mavi 3 Enterprise made by independent experts, indicates a potential shift toward more advanced platforms with excellent technical capabilities as non-state actors acquire more experience and resources (Hatu, 2024).

Beyond drones, other disruptive technologies used by terrorist groups have left their mark on the conflict. Geolocation and tracking systems, based on GPS infrastructure and mobile networks, enable tracking the movements of individuals and vehicles', facilitating operational planning and data collection (Blanquicet, 2025a; Cano Cuevas, 2023). Unsurprisingly, this indiscriminate use raises serious concerns about privacy and the possible implementation of mass surveillance; similarly, the ability to intercept telephone and internet communications, although useful for intelligence gathering, violates fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and confidentiality.

The confluence of these disruptive technologies has produced a hybrid war-criminal ecosystem in which information has become a strategic weapon (Álvarez-Calderón & Rodríguez-Beltrán, 2018). Collecting, analyzing, and disseminating true and false information allows actors in conflict to influence public perception and manipulate opinion. Disruptive impact is evident in the hardware, software, and algorithms that process data, enabling the automation of tasks and decision-making in real-time. It is crucial to recognize that these technologies are inherently political, with impacts shaped by context and user intent. In the case of Colombia, the emergence of disruptive technologies has led to a continuous transformation with significant ethical, legal, and humanitarian implications that necessitate thorough analysis and effective regulation.

Other advanced technologies are already influencing and may further transform the dynamics in Colombia significantly. For instance, as suggested by Vera-Piñeros et al. (2023), Artificial Intelligence (AI), space capabilities, hypersonic missiles, and biotechnology are key technologies driving the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which has profound implications for military affairs and national security. In this scenario, AI presents a paradox in its application to armed conflict (Matiz-Rojas and Fernández-Camargo, 2023); on the one hand, it offers opportunities to improve security and combat illicit activities, as AI could be beneficial for enhancing Colombia's capacity to combat drug trafficking, insurgency, illegal mining, and smuggling by enabling more efficient data analysis and better resource allocation (Vera-Piñeros et al., 2023). In addition, AI and big data, supported by polycentric governance, can be utilized as tools for citizen security in Colombia through enhanced approaches to data governance protection (Fernández-Osorio et al., 2024). On the other hand, there are significant concerns about the potential misuse of AI for psychological warfare, the spread of disinformation and propaganda, and the manipulation of public opinion. AI's capacity to process vast amounts of data and automate decision-making processes could confer a substantial strategic advantage to actors capable of its effective deployment.

Space technologies, primarily satellite-based systems, constitute essential enablers of modern military operations, including those conducted in Colombia. Access to satellite communications is vital for controlling drones beyond the line of sight; additionally, GPS enables precise navigation for both drones and ground forces, while satellite imagery offers critical Intelligence and surveillance capabilities, which are particularly valuable given Colombia's complex terrain. Although direct weaponization of space does not currently characterize the Colombian internal conflict; reliance on space-based assets for command, control, communications, and Intelligence (C3I) underscores their foundational role in enabling technologically advanced operations, including drone deployments.

Considering the potential interrelationship and synergistic effects between these disruptive technologies and drone systems within the Colombian context is central. For example, AI could significantly enhance drone autonomy, targeting precision, and decision-making capabilities. Likewise, space-based communication networks are indispensable for controlling drones over extended distances as the integration of these technologies could amplify their impact and further transform the nature of the conflict.

The Colombian conflict is evolving amid a global context of rapid technological advancement; therefore, understanding the potential effects of various disruptive technologies beyond drones is essential for developing effective long-term security strategies and anticipating emerging challenges. Focusing solely on drones would provide an incomplete view of the technological forces shaping the conflict; therefore, Colombia should strategically prioritize the development and responsible use of disruptive dual-use technologies, principally in the cyber and space domains, to enhance its security and defense capabilities, adapting to the evolving technological landscape of the conflict.

Humanitarian Implications of Drones: The Cost of Technological Disruption

The increasing use of drones in Colombia has brought a series of profound humanitarian implications, manifesting in various ways, including indiscriminate attacks, the consequences of constant surveillance, forced displacement, and profound psychological effects on the civilian population. The use of disruptive technologies -particularly drones - in the context of 5GW, has generated a range of humanitarian implications that undermine the protection of fundamental rights in the Colombian conflict, impacting the civilian population in multiple dimensions, from the imminent risk of indiscriminate attacks to the erosion of privacy and the generation of deep psychological trauma (DW, 2025).

The risk of indiscriminate attacks is heightened by the difficulty of distinguishing legitimate military targets from civilians, compounded by drones' ability to operate in ambiguous areas, where armed actors blend in with the population, increases the likelihood of errors and collateral damage. The perceived precision of armed drones diminishes in asymmetric conflicts, where limited information complicates target identification, and the lack of transparency in decision-making, combined with the absence of accountability mechanisms, exacerbates this risk.

Indiscriminate drone attacks have left a trail of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure in Colombia. A direct testimony from a resident of the El Plateado district in Argelia, Cauca, recounts how a drone-launched explosive device struck a hardware store located in the urban center, causing a fire that spread to nearby homes and injuring an older adult and a minor (Noticias Caracol, 2024). Although some reports mentioned at least 19 drone attacks against military forces in 2024, they also highlight ongoing efforts by security and defense agencies to develop long-term strategies to guarantee the safety of both the armed forces and the civilian population affected by these attacks (Mazo González, 2024). Another report details intense clashes between dissident groups in El Plateado, Cauca, during which drones were used to launch explosive devices, causing widespread panic among the civilian population caught in the crossfire (Agudelo, 2024); and four civilians were victims of drone attacks carried out by FARC dissidents in 2024 (Patiño, 2024).

These incidents reveal a troubling pattern of civilian harm linked to drone use in the Colombian conflict. Growing evidence, including direct witness accounts and news reports, shows that drone strikes in Colombia by non-state armed groups cause civilian casualties, injuries, and damage to homes and livelihoods, demonstrating a significant and alarming humanitarian cost associated with this technology. Drone use in clashes between non-state armed groups aggravates the risk to civilian populations, who are inadvertently caught in the crossfire of these technologically enabled internal conflicts (Saumeth, 2024).

Affected communities experience daily feelings of constant surveillance and the loss of privacy, as the presence of drones, visible or invisible, generates permanent alerts (Ahmad et al., 2021). The ability to collect personal information through geolocation and facial recognition systems violates privacy and autonomy as the information collected can be used to generate behavioral patterns, exposing vulnerable populations. Forced displacement also emerges as a complex consequence of drone use in the conflict, as the threat comes not only from direct attacks but from persistent surveillance that establishes a state of paralysis in communities (Storai & Idrees, 2018). This constant presence prevents populations from carrying out their subsistence activities, such as agriculture or pastoralism, due to fear of being mistaken for military targets. In the logic of the 5GW, this displacement can even constitute a tactical objective to clear strategic corridors or destabilize regions; thus, drones become a tool of territorial control that expels the population without the need for a conventional ground offensive.

Psychological and emotional effects arise as the constant presence of drones reminds civilians of violence, creating a state of alertness and fear. The loss of loved ones, the destruction of property, and the constant feeling of danger take a heavy toll on the mental health of the people. The possibility of constant and widespread aerial surveillance fosters feelings of being watched, leading to loss of privacy, increased anxiety and fear, and chilling effects on freedom of assembly and expression, even if there are no direct attacks (Fisk et al., 2019).

The use of technology to record human rights abuses provides people with the opportunity to hold perpetrators accountable and seek justice (Giardullo, 2021). Drones and related technologies enable the gathering of evidence, such as photographs, videos, or audio recordings, to document violations. This proof can be used to investigate war crimes and human rights abuses, as well as to support transitional justice processes. However, it is crucial to keep this evidence safe, as it must be reliable for its use in court. The independence of armed drones and their capacity to make decisions autonomously present ethical challenges regarding accountability in cases of mistakes or unintended harm, prompting ethical and humanitarian concerns that lead to inquiries about the autonomy of weapons, human accountability, and the responsibility of their users.

Additionally, it is challenging to monitor and regulate these technologies because their development and use are not entirely transparent. In Colombia, these humanitarian consequences are linked to the conflict's unique dynamics, including the presence of illegal armed groups, the country's complex geography, and the fragility of the peace processes, which exacerbate the risks and challenges associated with it.

To clearly show the human experiences and suffering caused by drone attacks, it is important to include direct testimonies and get detailed reports from human rights groups working in Colombia. Although certain excerpts may lack specific reporting from Colombian human rights organizations regarding drone usage, it is crucial to underscore the necessity for such reporting and possibly cite general conclusions from international human rights organizations concerning drone warfare. The humanitarian consequences of drone warfare in the Colombian conflict are extensive, transcending immediate physical injuries, to include substantial long-term psychological, social, and economic effects on individuals, families, and even communities. The constant threat of drone attacks can make it hard for people to make a living, get an education, and get medical care; additionally, it can also break down social trust and create a cycle of vulnerability and dependence on outside help, which increases the problems that communities in conflict zones are already facing.

Ethical and Humanitarian Dilemmas in the Age of Autonomous Drones

The proliferation of drone technology in the Colombian conflict raises significant ethical and humanitarian dilemmas that extend beyond the prospect of LAWS. Even remotely piloted drones currently in operation, especially commercially adapted systems used by non-state actors, pose significant challenges to the application of IHL principles.

While the cardinal principles of IHL - distinction, proportionality, and precautions - remain the applicable legal framework, the use of drones in the context of 5GW challenges raises questions about not only their implementation but also their fundamental sufficiency in regulating this form of violence. First, the principle of distinction in the context of remote surveillance is significantly compromised by the difficulty of accurately distinguishing between combatants and civilians when the operator is physically removed from the battlefield. The principle of distinction was conceived in a context where human judgment relied on direct sensory perception. In drone warfare, this judgment is replaced by a pattern of life analysis through cameras, which often relies on imperfect Intelligence, exponentially increasing the risk of fatal errors against the civilian population. The sufficiency of the principle is questioned when technology itself degrades the human's capacity to make the distinction required by law.

Second, the principle of proportionality and cumulative damage, which weighs anticipated military advantage against incidental civilian harm, proves insufficient. This principle traditionally focuses on immediate physical harm, however, overlooks cumulative psychological and social impacts, which are strategic objectives in 5GW. How can proportionality be measured in an attack where military advantage is minimal, yet it contributes to widespread terror and social paralysis throughout an entire community? The humanitarian harm caused by constant surveillance and systemic fear exceeds the scope of the traditional proportionality assessments.

Third, the precautionary principle in warfare, which mandates taking all feasible measures to minimize civilian harm, is also compromised. Radical asymmetry, where the attacker faces no personal risk, can lower the threshold for using lethal force and reduce incentives to exercise maximum caution. The "feasibility" of precaution is interpreted differently when no reciprocal risk exist, which calls into question whether this principle alone can be sufficient to contain the expansive use of this technology.

Finally, the IHL accountability model, based on transparent military chains of command, is fractured, resulting in the dilution of responsibility. In cases involving commercial drones adapted by non-state actors, responsibility becomes diffused among the drone manufacturer, the software programmer who modifies the drone to carry explosives, and the end operator. This fragmentation creates an accountability gap that the existing legal framework fails to reliably address, leaving victims without a clear path to justice and reparation. Although Colombian regulations assign responsibility to operators for existing autonomous flight plans (Iaerocol, 2024; Unidad Administrativa Especial de Aeronáutica Civil, 2024a, 2024b), applying this framework to fully autonomous lethal decision-making remains problematic.

As Gantiva-Castiblanco (2021) highlights, the inherent difficulty in delegating trust and assigning responsibility to AI systems arises from the lack of identifiable emotional states and the inability to bear moral and legal accountability, in the same manner as humans do. Other studies emphasize the importance of preserving human responsibility in decisions regarding weapons use, arguing that accountability cannot be delegated to machines (Marín-Tovar & Ramírez-Sanguino, 2022).

Considerable debate surrounds the morality and legality of allowing machines to decide when to use lethal force. Does this constitute a violation of fundamental rules of war and human dignity? The prospect of autonomous weapons systems making life-or-death decisions without direct human involvement raises significant ethical dilemmas regarding the sanctity of human life, the risk of unintended conflict escalation, and the diminishing of human oversight over the application of force, especially within the intricate and unstable Colombian context. Giving machines the power to decide who lives and who dies could make it easier to use deadly force and have unintended effects that go against basic humanitarian principles.

Although no direct evidence proves that fully autonomous drones are currently deployed or actively considered by any party in the Colombian conflict, it is essential to acknowledge the rapid advancement of military technology. It is necessary to carefully consider the risks and potential benefits of using fully autonomous drones in the country alongside the ethical and humanitarian issues that have been raised. In Colombia, the delegation of lethal decision-making machines should be approached with caution and possibly avoided altogether, as there are currently no clear lines of responsibility, making it difficult to hold individuals accountable.

To mitigate the significant humanitarian impacts of drone use and uphold the protection of human rights and the application of IHL, the following specific and detailed recommendations may be proposed for the Colombian government. First, it is imperative to develop specific, comprehensive, and legally sound legislation and regulations governing the acquisition, use, and deployment of all types of drones (military, police, and civilian drones with the potential for militarization) within Colombia, ensuring strict compliance with international human rights law and IHL. Such legislation should specify the conditions for drone use, restrictions within conflict zones, and penalties for breaches.

Second, prioritizing the acquisition, development, and deployment of advanced technologies and practical strategies to detect, track, identify, and neutralize hostile drones operated by non-state armed groups should be a top priority. It is also crucial to ensure that these countermeasures are in accordance with international law and pose the least risk to civilians. Third, it is essential to establish independent and impartial mechanisms to investigate all drone attacks or other events accusing civilian harm or allegations of human rights or IHL violations. This guarantees that those responsible are held accountable through due process. Fourth, all military, police, and government workers operating drones in armed conflict should undergo rigorous and continuous training on the legal, moral, and humanitarian effects of doing so, emphasizing the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.

Likewise, suggestions can be formulated for international actors. To begin, the Colombian government should engage experts in technology and law to develop and implement drone rules and counter-drone strategies that fully comply with IHL. Secondly, all parties should keep a closer eye on how drones are used, and any credible claims of human rights abuses or violations of IHL that happen because of drone use should be publicly disclosed. Thirdly, the Colombian government, non-state armed groups (where feasible), civil society organizations, and affected communities should all be encouraged to engage in dialogue and collaborate to address humanitarian concerns related to drone warfare and explore mitigation strategies.

Moreover, suggestions may be offered for civil society organizations. First, an increase in independent reporting on civilian harm caused by drone strikes in Colombia is necessary. Second, there should be stronger efforts at both the national and international levels to protect human rights, hold violators accountable, and adhere to IHL. Third, there should be implemented public awareness campaigns and educational programs to teach people and decision-makers about the humanitarian effects of drone warfare in Colombia. This will enable individuals to have a more informed and ethical discussion about the use of this technology. Finally, there should be independent research and analysis on how the use of drones has changed in the Colombian conflict, how it has affected communities, and how well current laws and regulations work.

Conclusions

The increasing utilization of drones in the Colombian conflict represents a major transformation with significant humanitarian consequences. The widespread use of these devices, especially commercially modified ones by non-state armed groups, complicates distinguishing legitimate targets from civilians. It also facilitates the conduct of information and psychological warfare, and it has a real human cost in the form of random attacks, constant surveillance, forced displacement, and psychological impacts on civilians.

This analysis on the use of drones and other disruptive technologies in Colombia, taking 5GW into account, reveals a complex and challenging conflict environment as the proliferation of these technologies has significantly altered the defense and security scenario. Consequently, it is imperative to carefully consider the humanitarian effects and update current legislation as drones exacerbate the already complex borders of 5GW, leading to increased ambiguity and a higher risk of collateral damage. Their capacity to collect and share data exacerbates polarization and mistrust, which is precisely what information warfare is all about. The presence of drones creates psychological warfare that makes people in communities feel alarmed, as drones make asymmetric warfare easier.

The humanitarian consequences are clear and multifaceted. Drone warfare entails numerous harmful effects, such as risk of random attacks, feelings of being watched all the time, forced displacement, and profound psychological trauma. Technology can help document human rights abuses, but it can also make it more challenging to preserve evidence and hold individuals accountable. It is critical to recognize that technology is not neutral, as its effects depend on the situation and the individuals or groups that utilize it. In Colombia, the rise of disruptive technologies demands robust regulatory frameworks, efficient oversight mechanisms, and strategies to combat disinformation.

The ethical and humanitarian dilemmas presented by the potential autonomous drone deployment requires a prudent strategy and reinforced human oversight in the application of lethal force. Global conflict experiences underscore the necessity of robust regulatory frameworks and developing counter-drone capabilities, and protecting human rights and ensuring compliance with IHL requires coordinated action from the Colombian government, international bodies, and civil society. This means strengthening laws, investing in countermeasures, establishing mechanisms to hold individuals accountable, and providing everyone with thorough training, all based on the fundamental principles of IHL. In the context of the Colombian conflict, proactive and coordinated action is necessary to deal with the problems caused by this disruptive technology.

It is crucial that all parties involved in the Colombian conflict must strictly follow the basic rules of IHL, such as the principles of distinction (between combatants and civilians), proportionality (making sure that the expected military gain is greater than the expected civilian harm), and precaution (taking all reasonable steps to avoid or reduce civilian casualties and damage). All actors, state or non-state, must fully respect and comply with these IHL principles in the planning and execution of drone operations.

Acknowledgements: The author would like to express sincerely gratitude to the Escuela de Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Asuntos Jurídicos del Ejército for their valuable support in the preparation of this article.

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Para citar este artículo/To reference this article/Para citar este artigo: Fernández-Osorio, A. (2025). Drones and Fifth Generation Warfare: Humanitarian Implications in the Colombian Conflict. Revista Logos Ciencia & Tecnología, 17(2), 32-49. https://doi.org/10.22335/rlct.v17i2.2127

Proyecto de investigación: Análisis de las herramientas pedagógicas para la enseñanza de los Derechos Humanos y el DIH en la educación militar en el Ejército Nacional.

Fuente de financiación: Escuela de Derechos Humanos, Derecho Internacional Humanitario y Asuntos Jurídicos del Ejército Nacional de Colombia.

Disclaimer: The author declares no potential conflict of interest related to the article. AI tools, such as Grammarly and Gemini AI, were utilized to refine writing, and improve stylistic coherence and grammatical accuracy in English. However, the presentation of critical analysis, argumentation, and conclusions are the sole responsibility of the author.

Declaraciones sobre uso de inteligencia artificial generativa: Declaro que SI se hizo uso de la IA generativa en la redacción del presente artículo, siendo utilizadas la(s) siguiente(s) herramienta(s): Grammarly y Gemini AI para perfeccionar la redacción y mejorar la coherencia estilística y la precisión gramatical en el idioma inglés. La presentación del análisis crítico, la argumentación y las conclusiones son responsabilidad exclusiva del autor.

Received: April 12, 2025; Revised: June 05, 2025; Accepted: June 15, 2025

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