Abstract

VELEZ GOMEZ, LUIS DIEGO. MODEL TO ESTABLISH PECUNIARY PENALTY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES. Dyna rev.fac.nac.minas [online]. 2012, vol.79, n.175, pp.7-14. ISSN 0012-7353.

This article tries to exhibit the basic model that sustains the development of optimal fines; the mechanism to discourage the interests of the rapist of the environmental regulation, and also the methods to reach compensatory effects on the damage done to the environment, are presented. The development of the subject of pecuniary sanctions (fines) and penalties (imprisonment) uses the contractual relation between the agent (the company) and principal (the regulating organization) to determine, through this relation, get into determination of an effective design of sanctions. The principal- agent model will be used to examine the effects of the corporative and individual sanctions on the incentives of fulfillment in the environmental context; in addition, the concepts of public goods, common good and externalities will be used as categories of analyses that allow the identification and valuation of environmental damages.

Keywords : Optimal penalties; Interests of the violator; Basic model; Environmental regulations; Financial penalties; relationship between the agent (the company) and principal (the regulator); effective design sanctions, performance incentives; public goods; common goods; externalities; environmental damage; Marginal cost.

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