Resumo

TORRES-VALDERRAMA, Henry Camilo  e  GALLEGO-VEGA, Luis Eduardo. Modeling dynamic procurement auctions of standardized supply contracts in electricity markets including bidders adaptation. Dyna rev.fac.nac.minas [online]. 2015, vol.82, n.192, pp.168-176. ISSN 0012-7353.  https://doi.org/10.15446/dyna.v82n192.48612.

Descendant Clock Auctions have been increasingly used in power markets. Traditional approaches are focused on discovering the bidders' best response but neglecting the bidders' adaptation. This paper presents an algorithm based on decision theory to estimate the bidders' behavior throughout the auction. The proposed model uses portfolio concepts and historical data of spot markets to estimate a long-term contract supply curve. This model was applied to evaluate the Colombia's Organized Market (MOR). Demand curve parameters and round size were varied to evaluate their impact over auction outputs. Results show that the demand curve has a quite small impact over bidders' decisions and round size management is useful to avoid non-competitive bidders' behavior. In addition, it is shown that auction's starting prices strongly influence auction's clearing prices. These results are extremely helpful to design market structures in power markets.

Palavras-chave : Dynamic Auction Model; Descending Clock Auction; Electric Energy Regulation; Colombian Electric Energy Market.

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