Resumo

FLOREZ QUINTERO, Daian Tatiana. Are Mental Disorders Natural Kinds?. rev.colomb.psiquiatr. [online]. 2015, vol.44, n.1, pp.33-40. ISSN 0034-7450.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rcp.2014.09.007.

A problem for both philosophers of Psychiatry and Psychiatrists within the domain of nosology is to determine which could be the more appropriate model to classify mental illnesses. Such an endeavor also requires questioning the very nature of mental illness. While trying to cope with the philosophical challenges of such a task, Peter Zachar purports to show that the nosological work in Psychiatry should not adhere to the model of natural kinds. He even considers that it is mistaken to treat mental disorders as natural kinds. Nonetheless, Zachar's view on the existence of natural kinds-even in domains where there is little room for doubting about their existence, like Chemistry-is very unstable. In 2001 he holds that there are no natural kinds, but in 2008 he argues that his objections to the model of natural kinds are more the manifestation of his skepticism against a tradition. Although the problem of the existence of natural kinds shall not be dealt with in this article, a brief description on how deflated is Zachar's view on this matter in 2008 is presented, with the central part of the article devoted to reconstruct and examine his rationale for the thesis that mental disorders are not natural kinds. In the critical section of this paper, it is suggested that, although Zachar's thesis may be right, the arguments he gives to support it are quite flawed.

Palavras-chave : Mental disorders; Natural kinds; Practical kinds; Zachar.

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