Abstract

MIRAMON-BOTERO, Santiago. THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE OF LENDERS: MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS CHAMPIONS?. Vniversitas [online]. 2017, n.135, pp.219-254. ISSN 0041-9060.  https://doi.org/10.11144/javeriana.vj135.cgrl.

The purpose of this research is to determine if the supervision of non-list- ed and non-financially distress companies by creditors in the United Kingdom helps to overcome the controlling shareholder agency problem, and if as a by-product of this supervision, minority shareholders are better protected by the creditors than by the incumbent legal framework in the United Kingdom (UK).

Keywords : Majority-minority shareholders agency problem; lender governance; loan agreements; UK Company Law.

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