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Ideas y Valores
versión impresa ISSN 0120-0062
Resumen
FORRERO MORA, JOSÉ ANDRÉ. ON THE VALUE OF TRUTH A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD RORTY. Ideas y Valores [online]. 2015, vol.64, n.157, pp.151-170. ISSN 0120-0062. https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v64n157.39928.
We affirm, with Rorty, that truth is not a property, and, against Rorty, that this position does not imply eliminating the concept of truth from theoretical discourse. The practices of speakers are analyzed using a pragmatist strategy, in order to show that one does not acquire the same commitments when attributing truth or attributing justification. The article discusses the sense in which the philosophical distinction between truth and justification is socially useful and, finally, shows that said distinction does not entail a mysterious metaphysics.
Palabras clave : R. Rorty; justification; language; truth.