Resumo

MIRANDA ROJAS, Rafael. A Posteriori Necessary Sentences, Weak Necessity and Rationalism. Ideas y Valores [online]. 2016, vol.65, n.160, pp.49-74. ISSN 0120-0062.  https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v65n160.42641.

The article states that a posteriori necessary sentences as proposed by S. Kripke require a weak understanding of necessity. This means: a) contingent existence of designatum (non-existence in any counterfactual situation), and b) rationalist dependence on a priori logical principles, particularly those of difference and identity. The main consequence is that a posteriori necessary sentences correspond to instances of these logical principles. Contrary to rationalism, this does not require that these be a priori sentences, given that their justification requires empirical information. Finally, the article argues that the distinction between denotation and designation supports the idea that weak necessity applies to instances of the class, and cannot be applied to the class itself, thus avoiding referential indeterminism.

Palavras-chave : S. Kripke; language; necessity; rationalism.

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