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Ideas y Valores
versión impresa ISSN 0120-0062
Resumen
ROJAS-LIZAMA, David. Reflections on Kant’s Practical Philosophy and His “Non-conceptualism”. Ideas y Valores [online]. 2017, vol.66, n.164, pp.105-127. ISSN 0120-0062. https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n164.53927.
The article examines the difference between the moral status of human beings and that of other animals in Kant’s practical philosophy, as well as the consequences of this distinction for the debate over conceptualism, focusing attention on two seemingly parallel lines: one that considers that non-human animals have the relative value of things, and another according to which non-human animals or non-rational humans can have non-conceptual access to objective representational contents. It analyzes the practical implications of the impossibility of non-conceptualism and shows how Kant rejects a strong non-conceptualism that attributes to those beings access to objective representations that justify practical or epistemic beliefs through protorational means.
Palabras clave : I. Kant; animals; conceptualism; practical philosophy.