Abstract

WAJNERMAN PAZ, Abel. The Problem of Anti-Luck Epistemology. Ideas y Valores [online]. 2017, vol.66, n.165, pp.217-236. ISSN 0120-0062.  https://doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n165.55657.

D. Pritchard holds that knowledge requires the satisfaction of an ability condition and an anti-luck condition that bear no relation of implication to each other. The article argues that the satisfaction of the anti-luck condition implies satisfying the ability condition for two reasons: first, that the main characteristics of Pritchard's case (TEMP) against this implication are shared by cases in which there is ability; and, second, that although A. Goldman's benevolent demon case is more effective than TEMP, it involves a different type of certainty than that required for knowledge. Finally, the article shows that Pritchard's response to the generality problem blocks the implication between certainty and ability, and proposes a counterexample that draws on the epistemology of testimony.

Keywords : D. Pritchard; knowledge; generality; ability; certainty.

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