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Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología

Print version ISSN 0120-0534

Abstract

MARTINEZ, FABIO ENRIQUE. CONCIENTE THE COMPUTATIONAL-CONNECTIONIST PROJECT IN THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUS ACTIVITY. rev.latinoam.psicol. [online]. 2006, vol.38, n.1, pp.137-148. ISSN 0120-0534.

Consciousness, that experienced flow of subjective states, is one of the mysteries, and perhaps, the fundamental challenge of science until now. It is also a field of exploration specially active and fruitful, a field that has passed over the frontier of XIX and XX centuries, and recently arrived again with a strong impetus in the XXI century. However, there is a great controversy about the plausibility of a theoretical, analytical and formal (v.g.: computational) explanation of the phenomena that we associate with consciousness. Is it possible to establish a reductionist explanation of consciousness? Or in other words, is it possible to make a description of the conscious phenomena expressed in terms of functional and/or causal relationships? In this article I give some relevant elements to sketch the sufficiency of explanation of the connectionist computational paradigm, and how we could elucidate the formal principles embedded in the study of consciousness. The purpose of the present article is to suggest that the plausibility of the connectionist paradigm is supported by the following issues: (1) the level of fine-grained detail with which we define the representation and computability of conscious states, (2) the methodological and conceptual advances of brain sciences, and (3) the difference that we assume between the notions of simulation, modelling and computational representation of consciousness. With these ideas in mind, through the manuscript I will show a basic framework to understand why connectionism can be a plausible candidate to think about a formal theory of consciousness. Finally, in the light of the previous statements, I will point out some important issues to discuss the plausibility of a computational theory of consciousness

Keywords : consciousness; connectionism; computational representation; neural coding; formal theories of consciousness..

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