Resumo

BARRIENTOS, Jorge Hugo. Stable and Farsighted Set of Networks. Lect. Econ. [online]. 2005, n.62, pp.191-205. ISSN 0120-2596.

In this paper we propose a model of network formation where the individual are farsighted. In other words, the players are able to see ahead and take decisions about changes on network structure. This characteristic means that agents' decisions that could change a network are not based on current payoffs but where they expect the process going to arrive. Hence, this feature becomes the main contribution of this paper. The other hand, the formation process proposed here rest on the crucial notion of Largest Consistent Set. It one is a notion common in Social Situations Theory

Palavras-chave : Game theory and bargaining theory; cooperative games and non-cooperative games.

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