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Lecturas de Economía

Print version ISSN 0120-2596


GATICA, Leonardo  and  SOTO, Georgina. Bureaucracy and Efficiency in the Provision of Public Goods: a Spatial Model of Political Competition. Lect. Econ. [online]. 2010, n.73, pp.67-97. ISSN 0120-2596.

This paper presents a spatial model of political competition exploring the effects of political competition on government performance, in the context of efficiency on the provision of public goods and the size of bureaucracy. In contrast with other arguments that sustain that there is a positive relationship between political competition and efficiency, this study's main result shows that in any political-economic equilibrium political competition provides incentives for an excess of bureaucratic employment and an inefficient provision of public goods.

Keywords : Government efficiency; political competition; government size.

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