Abstract

BLANDON RESTREPO, Daniel. Implementation in the Allocation of Projects with the Royalties in Colombia: A Theoretical Approach. Desarro. soc. [online]. 2017, n.78, pp.233-270. ISSN 0120-3584.  https://doi.org/10.13043/DYS.78.6.

This paper studies the implementation of majority voting in OCADs (Collegiate Administration and Decision Bodies) to choose which projects will be financed with royalties in Colombia. The results show that votes made in OCADs are not implementable unless some assumptions about leaders' preferences and the voting mechanism are added. Implementation is achieved assuming that the central government is always honest about its preferences; that departmental and municipal governments have unimodal preferences (such as when leaders show preferences for projects based on the proximity of these to their own regions); and that the first stage of voting (which is when mayors who will represent their municipal governments in the OCADs are elected) is carried out to vote for projects and not for mayors.

Keywords : Royalties; OCAD; majority rule; social choice; implementation.

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )