Abstract

VENEBRA MUNOZ, Marcela. The Crisis of Skepticism and the Philosophical Authenticity of Phenomenology. Rev. colomb. educ. [online]. 2017, n.72, pp.199-219. ISSN 0120-3916.

This research aims to present the central motivations of the criticism of skepticism that encompasses the entire development of Husserl's philosophy. More specifically, this work focuses on the analysis of the relationship between skepticism, naturalism, and the constructive possibility of philosophy as a rigorous science through the three most significant moments in Edmund Husserl's work: Logical Investigations, Ideas (1913), and The Crisis of European Sciences. The importance of this analysis lies in the possibility of demonstrating the unitary integrity of Husserl's transcendental project and its intrinsic coherence, a determining unity of the sense of rigorous science under which Husserl understands philosophy. First, in the Logical Investigations, skepticism is understood, mostly, as a metabasis deforming the limits between factic sciences, logic, and philosophy. Second, in the first book of Ideas, avoiding a relapse in skepticism depends on the clarity of distinction between facts and essences; and, third, in The Crisis, avoiding naturalism depends on the determination of the ultimate foundation of all philosophical and scientific work, that is, on the basic and elemental localization of Lebenswelt. Finally, the possibility of a rigorous science depends, at least in the first instance, on our capacity of avoiding being stuck in the pre-assumptions of naturalism that inevitably lead to skepticism.

Keywords : Naturalism; skepticism; philosophy as a rigorous science.

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