Resumo

LIZ GUTIERREZ, Antonio Manuel. Simulating Searle. Prax. filos. [online]. 2009, n.28, pp.117-142. ISSN 0120-4688.

After some decades of discussions about John Searle's criticism of computationalism, and especially of Artificial Intelligence, it is necessary to take those controversies in perspective. In spite of the great influence of Searle's approach, nor his mental experiment of "The Chinesse Room", nor his distinction between simulation and duplication can be taken as showing the failure of Computationalism. The contrast between "merely simulated realities" and "genuine realities" is not ontological, but epistemological. And his distinction between simulation and duplication is supported by a very ambiguous use of the notions of "cause" and "causal powers". Against what is intended by Searle, there are not conclusive a priory arguments for a rejection of Computationalism.

Palavras-chave : Mind; computationalism; artificial intelligence; simulation; causal powers.

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