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Praxis Filosófica

Print version ISSN 0120-4688

Abstract

DUHAU, Laura. The Moral Status of Animals: Equal or Less Than Humans?. Prax. filos. [online]. 2011, n.32, pp. 45-56. ISSN 0120-4688.

Within the views that consider that animals have moral status, there are two kinds of views: those that consider that animals have the same moral status than humans, and those that consider that animals have less moral status than humans. In this paper I argue that both kinds of views are practically and theoretically equivalent. In the first place, I will argue that there is no practical difference between the two kinds of views, since they can justify the same moral judgments. In the second place, I will argue that, even when superficially it seems that each kind of view justifies the same judgments in different ways, looking more deeply one can see that this is not the case; so there is also no substantial theoretical difference between the two kinds of views. Therefore, these two kinds of views do not constitute different options in the defense of animal rights.

Keywords : moral status; moral obligations; animal rights; moral claims.

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