Resumo

MIRANDA ROJAS, Rafael. Future Contingents, Bivalence and Epistemic Indeterminism. Prax. filos. [online]. 2012, n.35, pp.59-82. ISSN 0120-4688.

The first aim of this paper is to show how Aristotle accepts the principle of excluded middle and bivalence in statements about future contingent. The main consequence of this, against the trivalent positions, is that statements about future contingent have no truth value indeterminate: are either true or false. Different indeterministic positions are analyzed in order to show how these depend on an implausible thesis: i) the application of the principle of excluded middle and bivalence in statements about future results in determinism. It is proposed that the indeterminism attributed to these statements is epistemic, not alethic: a subject S does not know at time t before t1 the truth value of statements about future contingent.

Palavras-chave : Excluded Middle; Bivalence; Epistemic Indeterminism; Determinism; Indeterminate Truth Value.

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