Abstract

ZAVADIVKER, Nicolás. Neoracionalism and metaethics. Prax. filos. [online]. 2012, n.35, pp.83-96. ISSN 0120-4688.

The aim of this article is to analyze, from a metaethical perspective, the neo-racionalist thesis according to which the moral judgments has pretensions of validity. This position considers that it is essential to the moral judgments pretends to be rationally acceptable, and that them aspire to an intersubjective validity that anyone, in ideal conditions, should recognize. In the present article there will be questioned the scope of this thesis, and will be rejected the idea according to which a judgment of value is always invoking our disposition to be judged for a universal and entirely rational audience.

Keywords : moral judgments; metaethics; neo-racionalism; pretensions of validity.

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