Abstract

VIDAL, Javier. Personal Identity and Singular Thought. Prax. filos. [online]. 2013, n.36, pp.29-49. ISSN 0120-4688.

The Hospital Argument by D. Parfit includes the premise that in a case of split brain, the identity of a new human person will depend on whether the other cerebral hemisphere is transplanted to another body. The identity of a human person will depend on extrinsic facts. The objective I have is to question this premise with the help of some remarks on the content of the singular thoughts: first-person and demonstrative thoughts. On the one hand, I state that in the scenario described by Parfit the human person whose identity is dependent would not be able to have a first-person thought because she would not be able to know-who is the thinker, who, of course, is her herself. Then, it would not be possible to refer to oneself and to have a first-person thought about an experience would not be a form of self-knowledge. On the other hand, I establish that it would also not be possible to refer to that person with the help of a kind of demonstrative thought based on perception

Keywords : personal identity; singular thought; self-reference; self- knowledge; know-who; perception.

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