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Praxis Filosófica

Print version ISSN 0120-4688On-line version ISSN 2389-9387

Abstract

ORDONEZ PINILLA, Camilo Andrés. Mcdowell: passivity, content and perception. Prax. filos. [online]. 2017, n.44, pp.13-36. ISSN 0120-4688.

In his book Mind and World, John McDowell proposes a characterization of perception as a passive cognitive process. In this text I want to show that such characterization has a fundamental problem: it would imply that perception has not content, according to McDowell’s model of intentionality. Since such consequence is undesirable in McDowell’s philosophical project, this would show that there is a logical tension between McDowell’s conception of experience as a passive process and his conception of the conditions for content. In order to achieve this goal, first, I will explain what means to sustain that perception is passive, in McDowell’s sense. Second, I will propose that if McDowell’s model of intentionality, content and passivity is assumed, it would not be possible that perception be both passive and contentful (i.e. an intentional state).

Keywords : perception; passivity; content; intentionality.

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