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Praxis Filosófica

Print version ISSN 0120-4688
On-line version ISSN 2389-9387


PINEDA-PEREZ, Christian F.. The academic responses to the apraxia objection. Prax. filos. [online]. 2018, n.46, pp.221-242. ISSN 0120-4688.

In this paper, I reconstruct and analyze the Academic skeptics’ responses to the apraxia objection. This objection claims that the scepticism is a doctrine impossible to be put into practice because its theses lead to apraxia, that is, a state of lack or impossibility of action. The responses to the objection are divided into two kinds. The first one proves that assent is not a necessary condition to perform actions, so the skeptical advice to globally and wholly suspend assent does not lead to apraxia. The second one proves that it is possible to deliberate and rationally lead our actions without apprehensive impressions, so the skeptical thesis that apprehensive impressions do not exist does not lead to apraxia either. After some general considerations, in the first section of this paper I discuss Arcesilaus’ responses and in the second section Carneades’ responses.

Keywords : Academic skepticism; Stoicism; Hellenistic Philosophy; apraxia; assent.

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