SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
 issue50Perplexities of human dignity within the human rights frameworkLying, Deceiving and Misleading author indexsubject indexarticles search
Home Pagealphabetic serial listing  

Services on Demand

Journal

Article

Indicators

Related links

  • On index processCited by Google
  • Have no similar articlesSimilars in SciELO
  • On index processSimilars in Google

Share


Praxis Filosófica

Print version ISSN 0120-4688On-line version ISSN 2389-9387

Abstract

MORANDIN-AHUERMA, Fabio. The Value of the Moral Dilemmas for the Theory of Decision-Making. Prax. filos. [online]. 2020, n.50, pp.187-206. ISSN 0120-4688.  https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i50.8725.

This article analyzes the theory for decision making and contrasts the value of moral dilemmas to explain the deliberative mechanisms. It is argued that a successful decision strategy is one that is capable of performing the rational, adaptive and necessary movements to reach a programmed end. It suggests that the processes related to change and feedback can be useful but insufficient explanations if the theory of decisions is framed to deontological, utilitarian or emotional postures. The value of moral dilemmas and some recurrent criticisms are examined and it is concluded that, personal or impersonal, the dilemmas do not seem to explain the complexity of the deliberative processes.

Keywords : Decision-Making Theory; Moral Dilemmas; Moral Brain; Feedback; Trolley Dilemma.

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )