Resumo

DAMSCHEN, Gregor. DISPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE-HOW VS. PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE-THAT. Univ. philos. [online]. 2011, vol.28, n.57, pp.189-212. ISSN 0120-5323.

Is knowledge-how a hidden knowledge-that, and therefore also a relation between an epistemic subject and a proposition? What is the connection between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? I will deal with both questions in the course of my paper. In the first part, I argue that the term 'knowledge-how' is an ambiguous term in a semantic pragmatic sense, blending two distinct meanings: 'knowledge-how' in the sense of knowledge-that, and 'knowledge-how' in the sense of an ability. In the second part of my paper, I construe five alternative ways of correlating knowledge-that and knowledge-how in the sense of an ability. I will argue in favour of one of them. I will show that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that but rather that knowledge-that is a species of knowledge-how. More specifically, dispositional knowledge-how is at the core of propositional knowledge-that and accordingly should be understood to be at the center of epistemology.

Palavras-chave : dispositional knowledge-how; propositional knowledge-that; ability; practical knowledge; epistemology.

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