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Universitas Philosophica
Print version ISSN 0120-5323
Abstract
STEINFATH, Holmer. EMOTIONS, VALUES AND MORAL. Univ. philos. [online]. 2014, vol.31, n.63, pp.71-96. ISSN 0120-5323. https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.uph31-63.evms.
In current meta-ethical debates, many authors believe that there is a close relation between emotions and values. Some think emotions help to constitute moral and non-moral values. Others see emotions as epistemic devices to gain knowledge of values. Both views have roots reaching well back into the history of philosophy, and both can be developed to either support or undermine realistic and anti-realistic theories of value. The article aims to clarify a complicated dialectical situation. In addition, it makes a constructive proposal towards a better understanding of the connection between emotions and values. Though anti-realistic in spirit, this proposal is designed to integrate some important realistic intuitions as well.
Keywords : emotions; values; value-realism; desires; value judgment.