Abstract

CANO PLATA, Eduardo Antonio  and  CANO PLATA, Carlos Alberto. Los contratos, las asimetrías de la información en la salud, el riesgo moral y la selección adversa. Rev. esc.adm.neg [online]. 2009, n.67, pp.5-19. ISSN 0120-8160.

This paper describes the situations in which there is evidence of asymmetrical information in the contractual relation in the Health Social Security System; that is to say, situations in which an agent knows something that another ignores. This paper deals with two main topics: Moral Risk and Adverse Selection and it aims at contextualizing the readers on the presented problem and making all differences clear, having the contractual issue as its principle focus. In the last 15 years, information economy may be the most advanced within the economic theory. It is based on the objective of exploring and analyzing the existing information asymmetry among different economic agents, its organization and operation.

Keywords : Information asymmetry; Moral risk; Adverse Selection; Contractual.

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