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Prolegómenos

Print version ISSN 0121-182X

Abstract

HERNANDEZ GOMEZ, José Ricardo. ANTI-CORRUPTION IN COLOMBIA: THE UNDERCOVER AGENT AND THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION. Prolegómenos [online]. 2018, vol.21, n.41, pp.99-114. ISSN 0121-182X.  https://doi.org/10.18359/prole.3332.

The hereby article has as a goal to set forth the undercover agent as an anti-corruption tool to the scientific community. The transversal descriptive method - supported onto formal sources analysis - built the research from a gnoseological construction of the corruption concept, pointing out some inputs of the Constitutional Court and enunciating current and most relevant legislation in order to, subsequently, show the legal and operational deficiencies of that figure, its lack of concordance in relation to a preventive model and, its incapability to foresee crimes related to the phenomena. Based on those disagreements it was explored and proposed the use of both the intelligence and counterintelligence function as a preemptive prototype of excellence, supported on its teleological structure and its historical path.

Keywords : Corruption; undercover activity; intelligence services.

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