Abstract

PRITCHARD, Duncan  and  ROSALENY, Vicente Raga. The sources of scepticism. Estud.filos [online]. 2019, n.60, pp.239-266. ISSN 0121-3628.  https://doi.org/10.17533/10.17533/udea.ef.n60a12.

It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epis- temological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct subproblems-a formulation that turns on the closure principle, and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal-at least when properly formulated-can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account fails to gain any purchase on underdetermination-based radical scepticism. The antidote to this latter form of radical scepticism lies elsewhere-with, it is suggested, epistemological disjunctivism.

Keywords : belief; closure; epistemological disjunctivism; hinge commitments; knowledge; perception; scepticism; underdetermination; Wittgenstein..

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