Resumo

CRUZ RODRIGUEZ, Michael. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN COLOMBIA. JUDICIAL ROLES IN NEGOTIATED PEACE PROCESSES. anal.polit. [online]. 2022, vol.35, n.105, pp.242-271.  Epub 23-Abr-2023. ISSN 0121-4705.  https://doi.org/10.15446/anpol.v35n105.107758.

The article analyzes the roles of the Constitutional Court in the framework of democratization promoted by the discourse of transitional justice in Colombia, seeking to draw analytical inferences about national courts in peace processes negotiated within the constitutional order. Based on a comparative study of the roles of the Court through constitutional control in the Justice and Peace process in 2005 and the process of construction and implementation of the Final Peace Agreement in 2016, it is inferred that when there is judicial deference with the executive power as a historical constant: a) with a higher degree of anticipation of the jurisprudence of the courts by political actors, there will be a more restricted and predictable judicial intervention; b) when there is an institutional history of high judicial independence, the legitimizing role of the courts makes it more likely that they will increase their level of influence in the negotiated peace process or its implementation; and c) despite restrictions due to the political context, the courts have some freedom to define their institutional position in the transitions. These inferences could illustrate other cases or studies with similar variables.

Palavras-chave : Constitutional Court of Colombia; constitutional control; democratization; transitional justice; Special Jurisdiction for Peace; negotiated peace..

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