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Cuadernos de Economía
Print version ISSN 0121-4772On-line version ISSN 2248-4337
Abstract
CANTE, Freddy. EL TEOREMA DE LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DE ARROW Y LA ELECCIÓN INTERDEPENDIENTE. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2000, vol.19, n.33, pp.71-82. ISSN 0121-4772.
I the problem of the social choice is characterized as a process of interdependent decision, also admitting the interpersonal comparison of the expectations and states of the world of citizens and assuming that the social interaction implies negotiable and not negotiable conflicts, it is possible to foresee consent situations and social