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vol.19 issue33LA ESTRUCTURA LÓGICA DE LA TEORÍA GENERAL DE KEYNES: UNA CRÍTICA DE BENETTILOS PRECIOS DE LOS RECURSOS EN EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL author indexsubject indexarticles search
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Cuadernos de Economía

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Abstract

CANTE, Freddy. EL TEOREMA DE LA IMPOSIBILIDAD DE ARROW Y LA ELECCIÓN INTERDEPENDIENTE. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2000, vol.19, n.33, pp.71-82. ISSN 0121-4772.

I the problem of the social choice is characterized as a process of interdependent decision, also admitting the interpersonal comparison of the expectations and states of the world of citizens and assuming that the social interaction implies negotiable and not negotiable conflicts, it is possible to foresee consent situations and social

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