Abstract

TOGNATO, Carlo. IS INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY IN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANKING A COMMUNICATIVE MATTER?. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2005, vol.24, n.42, pp.117-134. ISSN 0121-4772.

Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It does not matter to them whether monetary affairs become a rational game aimed at preserving the value of currency or take on the form of a medieval morality play. This paper suggests that the very political economy of central bank independence requires a departure from such practice. It is argued that communicative coordination of the monetary game is relevant to understanding how independent central banks can achieve institutional efficiency and why they face no trade-off between institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy. It is particularly suggested that an institutionally efficient central bank cannot but act as an agent of communicative empowerment for the audience providing the local context for its operation.

Keywords : independent central bank; communication; democracy.

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