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Cuadernos de Economía

Print version ISSN 0121-4772

Abstract

CENDALES, Andrés  and  MORA, Jhon James. Bribery or democratic representation: What do municipal councils promote in a precarious democracy at local level?. Cuad. Econ. [online]. 2015, vol.34, n.65, pp.443-474. ISSN 0121-4772.  http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/cuad.econ.v34n65.47822.

In the context of a precarious democracy at local level, this article shows that if the council is controlled principally by councilors who promote political agendas that seek to make those individuals who are economically more solvent and politically stronger have a greater and better participation in the provision of public goods and services, then such a representation would be unstable if the council favors only and exclusively the bribes it gets from the mayor in exchange for not imposing a veto on the proposed political agenda in the political negotiation process. That is, the majority representation that individuals better placed in the municipal economy achieve in the council, rather than benefitting them, only promotes the installment of a politically stable equilibrium of a predatory state at local level.

Keywords : Political economy; municipal public policy; players with the power of veto; predatory state.

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